Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme
The article is the continuation of the theme highlighted in the previous article with same title. The new article evaluates the results of digital protective relays (DPR) testing for immunity to the E1 component of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and to Intentional Electromagnetic Interf...
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Інститут технічних проблем магнетизму НАН України
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irk-123456789-1493942019-02-22T01:23:40Z Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme Gurevich, V. Дискусії The article is the continuation of the theme highlighted in the previous article with same title. The new article evaluates the results of digital protective relays (DPR) testing for immunity to the E1 component of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and to Intentional Electromagnetic Interferences (IEMI) impacts, conducted by some independent American organizations; discusses the features of relay protection devices as well as clarifies and supplements the procedure for testing these devices. Due to methodology errors during the DPR tests conducted by mentioned organizations earlier, they cannot be considered as satisfactory and their results as meaningful. At the moment there are no reliable data on the level of DPR immunity to IDEI, which suggests that the test should be conducted further. Статья является продолжением темы, рассмотренной в предыдущей статье с таким же названием. В новой статье оцениваются результаты испытаний микропроцессорных устройств релейной защиты (МУРЗ) на устойчивость к компоненту E1 электромагнитного импульса высотного ядерного взрыва (ЭМИ ЯВ) и к преднамеренным дистанционным электромагнитным воздействиям (ПДДВ), приводимые некоторыми независимыми американскими организациями; обсуждаются особенности методики их испытаний. Показано, что из-за ошибок в методологии испытаний, результаты, полученные упомянутыми выше организациями нельзя считать достоверными. В настоящее время нет никаких надежных данных об уровне устойчивости МУРЗ к ПДДВ, что указывает на необходимость проведения дополнительных испытаний. 2015 Article Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme / V. Gurevich // Електротехніка і електромеханіка. — 2015. — № 6. — С. 66–69. — Бібліогр.: 7 назв. — англ. 2074-272X DOI: https://doi.org/10.20998/2074-272X.2015.6.12 http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/149394 316 en Електротехніка і електромеханіка Інститут технічних проблем магнетизму НАН України |
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Дискусії Дискусії |
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Дискусії Дискусії Gurevich, V. Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme Електротехніка і електромеханіка |
| description |
The article is the continuation of the theme highlighted in the previous article with same title. The new article evaluates the results of digital protective relays (DPR) testing for immunity to the E1 component of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
and to Intentional Electromagnetic Interferences (IEMI) impacts, conducted by some independent American organizations; discusses the features of relay protection devices as well as clarifies and supplements the procedure for testing these devices. Due to
methodology errors during the DPR tests conducted by mentioned organizations earlier, they cannot be considered as satisfactory
and their results as meaningful. At the moment there are no reliable data on the level of DPR immunity to IDEI, which suggests
that the test should be conducted further. |
| format |
Article |
| author |
Gurevich, V. |
| author_facet |
Gurevich, V. |
| author_sort |
Gurevich, V. |
| title |
Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme |
| title_short |
Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme |
| title_full |
Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme |
| title_fullStr |
Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme |
| title_sort |
problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. continuation of the theme |
| publisher |
Інститут технічних проблем магнетизму НАН України |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| topic_facet |
Дискусії |
| url |
http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/149394 |
| citation_txt |
Problems in testing digital protective relay for immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts. Continuation of the theme / V. Gurevich // Електротехніка і електромеханіка. — 2015. — № 6. — С. 66–69. — Бібліогр.: 7 назв. — англ. |
| series |
Електротехніка і електромеханіка |
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2025-07-12T22:02:13Z |
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2025-07-12T22:02:13Z |
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1837480268451020800 |
| fulltext |
Дискусії
66 ISSN 2074-272X. Електротехніка і Електромеханіка. 2015. №6
© V. Gurevich
УДК 316
V. Gurevich
PROBLEMS IN TESTING DIGITAL PROTECTIVE RELAY FOR IMMUNITY TO
INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTIVE ELECTROMAGNETIC IMPACTS. CONTINUATION
OF THE THEME
The article is the continuation of the theme highlighted in the previous article with same title. The new article evaluates the re-
sults of digital protective relays (DPR) testing for immunity to the E1 component of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
and to Intentional Electromagnetic Interferences (IEMI) impacts, conducted by some independent American organizations; dis-
cusses the features of relay protection devices as well as clarifies and supplements the procedure for testing these devices. Due to
methodology errors during the DPR tests conducted by mentioned organizations earlier, they cannot be considered as satisfactory
and their results as meaningful. At the moment there are no reliable data on the level of DPR immunity to IDEI, which suggests
that the test should be conducted further. References 7, figures 6.
Key words: high power electromagnetic threats, high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, intentional destructive electromagnetic
impacts, digital protective relays.
Статья является продолжением темы, рассмотренной в предыдущей статье с таким же названием. В новой ста-
тье оцениваются результаты испытаний микропроцессорных устройств релейной защиты (МУРЗ) на устойчивость
к компоненту E1 электромагнитного импульса высотного ядерного взрыва (ЭМИ ЯВ) и к преднамеренным дистанци-
онным электромагнитным воздействиям (ПДДВ), приводимые некоторыми независимыми американскими организа-
циями; обсуждаются особенности методики их испытаний. Показано, что из-за ошибок в методологии испытаний,
результаты, полученные упомянутыми выше организациями нельзя считать достоверными. В настоящее время нет
никаких надежных данных об уровне устойчивости МУРЗ к ПДДВ, что указывает на необходимость проведения до-
полнительных испытаний. Библ. 7, рис. 6.
Ключевые слова: электромагнитный импульс высотного ядерного взрыва, преднамеренные деструктивные электро-
магнитные воздействия, микропроцессорные устройства релейной защиты.
Introduction. In my previous article on this theme
[1] I presented a substantial analysis of the regulatory
documents related to the problem of Intentional Destruc-
tive Electromagnetic Impacts (IDEI) on Digital Protective
Relays (DPR). I justified the choice of test methods, ar-
ticulated the requirements to parameters of test impacts
and included a review of technical aids that facilitate
these tests. However, my communication with technical
staff responsible for these tests, which is provided in [1],
was not enough for the correct planning and conduction
of experiments. Analysis of findings of earlier tests re-
vealed that the methods used for trials, criteria of opera-
tion quality and parameters of testing impact are rarely
selected correctly resulting in the fact that the findings of
the tests do not allow making an unambiguous judgment
about DPR's resistance to IDEI. This requires conducting
further investigations of the issue and developing addi-
tional recommendations.
Use of performance criterion during the electro-
magnetic compatibility (EMC) test of electronic
equipment. The response of an object under test (OUT)
to electromagnetic impacts (EI) can be variable. For ex-
ample, the OUT can be fully inoperative due to a break-
down of internal electronic components, while on the
other hand it can be temporarily non-operative only dur-
ing the impact of either the impulse or electromagnetic
field. Another possibility is a short-term fault in the soft-
ware operation as affected by the impulse voltage sup-
plied to the OUT, which may require (or not) from the
operator to reset the internal program of the OUT. There
are many types of responses of the OUT to EI. The ac-
ceptable response of this type of OUT to electromagnetic
impact under some type of trial is called «performance
criterion» (PC). The performance criterion is an extremely
important indicator in the tests for EMC. When properly
selected it allows reaching a conclusion whether a specific
device has passed the specific test or not. However, the
EMC standards do not contain (and they are unlikely to
contain) the methods of the correct selection of these cri-
teria. As a rule everything is limited by a sentence like:
«Selection of the strictness degree for performance crite-
rion is performed by people who develop and approve
performance specifications and technical conditions» and
a chart from which a specific PC can be selected out of
3-4 criterions offered by the specific standard. This is
obvious, since the correct choice depends on the specific
type of OUT and specific modes and conditions of its
operation. Moreover, a different PC can be selected for
the same type of OUT depending on its operation mode,
connection diagram, purpose for use, working environ-
ment, etc. Thus, the understanding of specific features of
each single OUT is very important, since the choice of
one or another performance criterion allows making a
decision of whether this specific OUT fits (or doesn't fit)
specific working environment based on the trial results.
Features of performance criterion during the
IDEI immunity test of DPR. The North American Elec-
tric Reliability Council (NERC) has established a list of
equipment, which needs to be tested for immunity to High
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) upon the request
of special commission: Congressional «Commission to
Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromag-
netic Pulse (EMP) Attack». The list includes, in particu-
lar, digital protective relays (DPR) and SCADA (Supervi-
sory Control and Data Acquisition – a general name for
software and hardware measures of different types, which
ensure real-time data collection from numerous detectors,
processing, archiving, displaying and transferring infor-
mation about objects under monitoring as well as the
ISSN 2074-272X. Електротехніка і Електромеханіка. 2015. №6 67
transfer of operator commands to remote sites – founda-
tion of Substation Control System – SCS) system.
Metatech Company conducted tests of SEL-311L DPR
(Differential Line Protection) and SEL-2032 controller of
SCADA system (fig. 1) under a shortening test program.
The test was performed only for immunity to the E1 com-
ponent of HEMP. The results of these tests are presented
in the Meta-R-320 [2] report. As indicated in the report
evaluation of the correctness of operation and lack of
damages after each test was selected as PC in the DPR
and SCADA controller tests. During the tests short-time
(5/50 nsec) high-voltage impulses with an amplitude of up
to 8 kV were applied to different terminals of devices.
Fig. 1. SEL-311L DPR and SEL-2032 controller for SCADA
system produced by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories
(USA) subject to testing for HEMP immunity
The report also mentioned that application of im-
pulses with an amplitude of up to 3.2 kV to the serial port
resulted in spontaneous DPR switch-off, but then it re-
turned to normal operation mode. Some other ports (e.g.,
IRIG – Inter-Range Instrumentation Group time code –
time synchronization port) were damaged at as low as
600V. The Ethernet communication module of the
SCADA controller was damaged at 1.2 kV. The report
also suggests that the record of oscillographic tests of
current and voltage rates supplied to the relay's terminals
were selected as one of the additional parameters of PC. It
is mentioned in the report that abnormalities in the record
were not revealed during testing.
Criticism of the DPR testing method used in [2]
1. I think it is incorrect to use the PC based on the DPR
damages check after it is subjected to interference. This
does not allow making a definite conclusion about the
immunity of DPR to this interference. This is due to the
fact that DPR possesses several specific features reviewed
in [3, 4] as compared to the SCADA system. With all the
importance and responsibility of the SCADA system it is
designed in first and foremost for automatic collection,
processing and displaying information. Despite the fact
that the system includes the so-called Remote Terminal
Units (RTU) – remotely controlled actuating units, they
cannot work under the automatic mode and are only in-
tended for performance of operator commands from a
remote control center. The majority of modern substations
work in the automatic mode without any operator. Manual
control of breaker status on these substations (i.e., literally
control of power system configuration) is performed by
an operator sitting in a remote control center through the
SCADA system, which is susceptible to IDEI impacts.
This is why, in case of IDEI impact, the remote control of
a substation from the control center will likely be lost and
the configuration of the power system will only be deter-
mined by the relay protection system – the only system
that can automatically control the breaker status. At the
same time, the DPRs, which comprise the foundation of
the modern relay protection, are constantly sharing infor-
mation and commands in the automatic mode via com-
munication channels susceptible to IDEI (unlike the
SCADA system, where critical control commands are
delivered to breakers spearheaded by a dispatcher). In the
event of incorrect actions of automatic operating relay
protection, where the dispatcher cannot intrude, such as
unnecessary operation subject to IDEI impact, the electric
power system and then the whole energy system can fully
collapse. This is one of the reasons why the digital protec-
tion relay should be tested for IDEI impacts during op-
eration and not be checked for damages after the impact
of interference.
2. There are different paths of the entering of electro-
magnetic interference (represented by impulses supplied
to protected terminals) and high-voltage electromagnetic
waves (which enter directly into internal high-sensitive
electronic components or through unprotected termi-
nals/ports of electronic units as well as though multiple
cables connected to DPR and functioning as antennas
absorbing electromagnetic energy) to DPR. Moreover, the
IDEI is not limited to HEMP only. It includes directed
ultra-broadband high-frequency emissions of special
sources with power ratings of several Gigawatts and is
intended for remote destruction of electronic equipment
[4]. Unfortunately, the danger is caused not only by spe-
cial purpose devices intended for affecting electronic
equipment, but also by emissions of ordinary powerful
radars. For instance, in 1999 there was an officially regis-
tered event of devastating failure of the SCADA system at
the San Diego County Water Authority Company, which
supplies water to San Diego, CA. The reason for the fail-
ure was an emission of marine radar located 25 miles
away from the city. In 1980 a similar case was registered
on a gas supply line located 1.5 km away from Den
Helder port in the Netherlands. The latter case of SCADA
system damage by a marine radar resulted in a powerful
gas explosion. This is why testing of DPR immunity to
IDEI should not be limited by applying high-voltage im-
pulses to certain terminals only. It should by accompanied
by exposure of the OUT to electromagnetic emission from
a directional antenna as stipulated by corresponding stan-
dards [1].
3. It should be taken into consideration that a case of
HEMP it will affect not only high-sensitive electronic
equipment (DPR, hardware of SCADA system), but also
power facilities of energy systems, such as linear insula-
tors, transformers and power generators. It should be
noted that this equipment will be affected by not only the
E1 component of HEMP (modeled during trials [2]) under
these circumstances, but also by the other two compo-
nents, i.e., Е2 and Е3 [1]. Previous research [2] conducted
in the Soviet Union and the USA shows that the affect of
all components of HEMP can result in the damage of
power high-voltage equipment, such as break down of
linear insulators, saturation and burning of power trans-
formers, punctures of power generator insulation, etc. In
68 ISSN 2074-272X. Електротехніка і Електромеханіка. 2015. №6
other words, the moment of impact of a powerful elec-
tromagnetic interference on DPR matches in time with the
moment of changing of internal state of DPR elements,
which is due to emerging of emergency rates of controlled
current and voltage at its terminals. How will DPR behave
under this mode? Will the IDEI affected relay protection
be able to disconnect the saturating transformer or dam-
aged part of aerial line of punctured cable? Won't the
common directional operation of different DPR be a cause
of full disintegration and collapse of the energy system?
The research conducted in [2] does not provide an-
swers to these questions. «We have produced designs so
complicated that we cannot possibly anticipate all the
possible interactions of the inevitable failures; we add
safety devices that are deceived or avoided or defeated by
hidden paths in the systems» – wrote the famous specialist
on reliability and susceptibility of complex systems
Charles Perrow [5]. Perrow calls this problem «incompre-
hensibility» since even the ordinary incident can trigger
interactions, which are «not only unexpected, but also
unpredictable for a certain critical period of time». In
most accidents nobody could expect that certain «interac-
tion algorithms» will trigger others. Thus, nobody could
predict what happened. This has a relation to modern
rather complicated and branched relay protection system
the behavior of which is difficult to predict under the
IDEI impact.
Analysis of the result of the second independent
trial of the same type of DPR. Another test of the same
type of DPR (by an odd coincidence) is reported in a
promotional presentation of the producer of these devices
– Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Company – SEL
[6]. The presentation covers the results of testing of SEL-
311 DPR samples on the test-benches of US Army’s Pi-
catinny Arsenal in New Jersey for HEMP and electro-
magnetic impact (fig. 2).
Fig. 2. SEL-311 DPR test for IDEI impact on Picatinny Arsenal
test-benches in New Jersey [6]
The promotional presentation suggests that all tests
were successful. At the same time the deeper analysis of
the material reveals several odd things. For instance, the
advertisement depicted in fig. 3 suggests that SEL-311
was tested at field strength varied from 25 to 1000 V/m
whereas the military standard MIL-STD-461 requires
only 50 V/m.
The specialists of the renowned SEL Company
demonstrate a rather odd ignorance in their report. The
fact is that according to the MIL-STD-461 the units of
measure of the field strength under IDEI impact are kilo-
volts, while they report volts and the figure «50» is pre-
sented as 50 kV/m instead of 50 V/m.
Fig. 3. The text from the promotional brochure
of SEL Company [6]
The bar diagram illustrated in fig. 4 is even odder. It
shows that in reality the field strength of 1000 V/m was
implemented for testing at 1000-1500 MHz frequencies,
while at another of frequencies it was almost two times
lower. Another thing is that the dependence of amplitude
on the frequency does not correspond to MIL-STD-461.
Fig. 4. Parameters of electromagnetic emission during SEL-311
DPR testing [6]
It is obvious from the diagram that the levels of field
strength are limited by the beginning of the instability of
relay functioning (yellow areas on the tops of the bars). In
other words the diagram shows the area of steady opera-
tion of a separately installed (outside the relay protection
system) SEL terminal. This implies that the relay doesn't
allow for steady operation outside the area of values rep-
resented in this diagram with its extremely low levels of
electromagnetic field strength.
When comparing it with the above mentioned MIL-
STD-416 (fig. 5), you can see that the applied parameters
of testing impacts are far away from the requirements of
this standard. Considering the oddness of parameters se-
lection to test SEL-311 immunity to IDEI who can take
seriously about the manufacturer's statement that these
relays are resistant to IDEI?
Another problem is the selection of a single DPR
terminal as an OUT. As a rule, these terminals are manu-
factured in metal housings, which effectively weaken the
electromagnetic emission. This is why the test results for
electromagnetic impact on this single terminal are ex-
pected to be positive. In the field conditions DPR is
ISSN 2074-272X. Електротехніка і Електромеханіка. 2015. №6 69
entangled by multiple cables acting as antennas and ab-
sorbing electromagnetic energy delivering it to the inter-
nal elements of DPR; multiple terminals of DPR are inter-
connected through corresponding communication instru-
ments susceptible to IDEI impact. Thus, the test should be
performed on the whole relay protection system while in
operation rather than its single terminal.
An example of the correct approach to testing of
complex systems to which relay protection undoubtedly
belongs is represented by SCADA system testing de-
scribed in [7] (fig. 6).
Fig. 5. A diagram from page 138 of MIL-STD-416F to compare
with the diagram illustrated in fig. 1 (1 ns corresponds
to a frequency of 1 GHz)
Fig. 6. Testing of SCADA system for immunity to HEMP [7].
An antenna system of EMI simulator is seen above. The
elements of SCADA system are located in separate boxes and
connected with each other via a standard communication system
Thus, the results of two independent tests of the
DPR conducted by different manufacturers do not allow
coming to any conclusion on its real immunity to IDEI.
So, who would need these results?
Conclusions and recommendations:
1. Due to methodology errors during the DPR tests
conducted by independent organizations earlier, they can-
not be considered as satisfactory and their results as
meaningful. At the moment there are no reliable data on
the level of DPR immunity to IDEI, which suggests that
the test should be conducted further.
2. The kinds and modes of DPR tests should be fully per-
formed and correspond to the standards as described in [1].
3. The PC should be represented by a criterion, which
allows for controlling DPR operation under normal and
emergency modes of the object under protection when it
is affected by an electromagnetic interference instead of a
criterion that is based exclusively on checking the DPR
condition when the impact of interference is over.
4. Testing should be performed on both the separate
unit of DPR and the full relay protection system consist-
ing of several DPR units connected with each other by
several meters of cables via a corresponding communica-
tion device. At the same time electromagnetic energy
should affect the relay protection system, while impulse
tests for applied voltage should be performed on both
separate DPR units/communication devices and several
DPR units connected together with communication de-
vices simultaneously.
5. During the test several steps of test impulse ampli-
tude and electric field strength should be selected: from
minimum to maximum value within the ranges described
in the standards. The obtained data can be used during the
evaluation of immunity of the DPR installed in specific
cabinets and buildings, which possess a certain index of
electric field weakening. They can also be used in the
process of elaboration of requirements to further weaken-
ing of this field, if it is revealed that the current conditions
do not ensure the required immunity of DPR to IDEI.
REFERENCES
1. Gurevich V. Problems in testing digital protective relays for
immunity to intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts.
Global Journal of Advanced Research, 2014, vol.1, iss.2, pp.
159-173.
2. Savage E., Gilbert J., Radasky W. The early-time (E1) high-
altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) and its impact on the
U.S. power grid. Report Meta-R-320 for Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, 2010.
3. Gurevich V. Problems of standardization in relay protec-
tion. St. Petersburg: DEAN Publ., 2015. 168 p.
4. Gurevich V. Vulnerabilities of digital protective relays.
Problems and solutions. Moscow, Infra-Engineering Publ.,
2014. 256 p.
5. Perrow C. Normal accidents. Living with high risk technolo-
gies. First ed. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984.
6. EMP Effects on Protection and Control Systems. Schweitzer
Engineering Laboratories, 2014. 31 p.
7. Report of the commission to assess the threat to the United
States from electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. April 2008.
Received 03.07.2015
Vladimir I. Gurevich, Ph.D, Senior specialist,
Central Electric Laboratory of Israel Electric Corp.
31000, Israel, Haifa, POB 10,
e-mail: vladimir.gurevich@gmx.net
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