Political Culture in Ukraine
The "Euromaidan" protests in Ukraine (2013-2014) were motivated by people's great expectations of profound change through implementation of reforms and genuine democratisation of the society. Realisation of these expectations depends on many factors, including the pattern of politica...
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Iнститут соціології НАН України
2016
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irk-123456789-1819512021-12-06T01:26:28Z Political Culture in Ukraine Gatskova, K. Gatskov, M. The "Euromaidan" protests in Ukraine (2013-2014) were motivated by people's great expectations of profound change through implementation of reforms and genuine democratisation of the society. Realisation of these expectations depends on many factors, including the pattern of political culture, which reflects people s readiness to actively contribute to the establishment of a new democratic regime in their country. Analysis of citizens' political orientations over the past two decades shows that only a small part of the population can be called strong democrats, whereas the majority of people avoids active political participation and holds a rather output-oriented position, which may facilitate persistence of an authoritarian political regime. On the other hand, a new social movement represented by recently emerged numerous volunteer organisations and initiatives indicates a substantial positive change in people's political orientations. 2016 Article Political Culture in Ukraine / K. Gatskova , M. Gatskov // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. — 2016. — № 1. — С. 106-116. — англ. 1563-4426 http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/181951 en Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг Iнститут соціології НАН України |
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The "Euromaidan" protests in Ukraine (2013-2014) were motivated by people's great expectations of profound change through implementation of reforms and genuine democratisation of the society. Realisation of these expectations depends on many factors, including the pattern of political culture, which reflects people s readiness to actively contribute to the establishment of a new democratic regime in their country. Analysis of citizens' political orientations over the past two decades shows that only a small part of the population can be called strong democrats, whereas the majority of people avoids active political participation and holds a rather output-oriented position, which may facilitate persistence of an authoritarian political regime. On the other hand, a new social movement represented by recently emerged numerous volunteer organisations and initiatives indicates a substantial positive change in people's political orientations. |
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Gatskova, K. Gatskov, M. |
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Gatskova, K. Gatskov, M. Political Culture in Ukraine Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг |
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Gatskova, K. Gatskov, M. |
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Gatskova, K. |
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Political Culture in Ukraine |
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Political Culture in Ukraine |
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Political Culture in Ukraine |
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Political Culture in Ukraine |
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Political Culture in Ukraine |
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political culture in ukraine |
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Iнститут соціології НАН України |
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2016 |
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http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/181951 |
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Political Culture in Ukraine / K. Gatskova , M. Gatskov // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. — 2016. — № 1. — С. 106-116. — англ. |
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Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг |
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AT gatskovak politicalcultureinukraine AT gatskovm politicalcultureinukraine |
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2025-07-15T23:48:30Z |
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1837758918228443136 |
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Kseniia Gatskova, Maxim Gatskov
Political culture in Ukraine
KSENIIA GATSKOVA, UDC 659.4
329
MAXIM GATSKOV,
PhD Can di date, Re searcher at the Ba var ian Ac a -
demic Cen tre for Cen tral, East ern and South east -
ern Eu rope (BAYHOST), Regensburg, Ger many
Political Culture in Ukraine1
Abstract
The “Euromaidan” protests in Ukraine (2013-2014) were motivated by people’s great
expectations of profound change through implementation of reforms and genuine
democratisation of the society. Realisation of these expectations depends on many
factors, including the pattern of political culture, which reflects people’s readiness to
actively contribute to the establishment of a new democratic regime in their country.
Analysis of citizens’ political orientations over the past two decades shows that only a
small part of the population can be called strong democrats, whereas the majority of
people avoids active political participation and holds a rather output-oriented po -
sition, which may facilitate persistence of an authoritarian political regime. On the
other hand, a new social movement represented by recently emerged numerous volun -
teer organisations and initiatives indicates a substantial positive change in people’s
political orientations.
Keywords: political culture, political orientations, civil society
106 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1
1 A slightly modified version of this paper is published as IOS Policy Issue (No. 9 November
2015). Available at: http://www.ios-regensburg.de/ios-publikationen/diskussionspapiere/
policy-issues/2015/9-2015.html
Po lit i cal Ori en ta tions and Sta bil ity of the Po lit i cal Sys tem
Why are some po lit i cal sys tems sta ble and oth ers not? Why does the in tro -
duc tion of dem o cratic in sti tu tions not au to mat i cally lead to a con sol i dated de -
moc racy? What role do peo ple’s po lit i cal ori en ta tions play in the pro cess of de -
moc ra ti sa tion? The po lit i cal cul ture ap proach [Al mond, Verba, 1963; Dal ton,
Welzel, 2014] is cur rently one of the best es tab lished the o ret i cal con cepts that
help to find an swers to these ques tions.
A gen eral def i ni tion of the term “po lit i cal cul ture” reads as fol lows: “... the po -
lit i cal sys tem as in ter nal ised in the cognitions, feel ings, and eval u a tions of its
pop u la tion” [Al mond, Verba, 1963: p. 14]. The po lit i cal cul ture ap proach fo cuses
on po lit i cal ori en ta tions to ward po lit i cal ob jects, such as the sys tem in gen eral,
po lit i cal in put and out put pro cesses, and the role of the self in the sys tem. The ba -
sic idea of this ap proach is to cap ture pat terns of at ti tudes, be liefs and val ues of
the pop u la tion, in or der to ex plore whether po lit i cal in sti tu tions and peo ple’s ori -
en ta tions are con gru ous. The fun da men tal as sump tion be hind this ap proach is
that “a dem o cratic form of par tic i pa tory po lit i cal sys tem re quires as well a po lit i -
cal cul ture con sis tent with it” [Al mond, Verba, 1963: p. 5]. If such con sis tency is
not given, po lit i cal in sti tu tions are likely to fail to per form their es sen tial func -
tions. As a re sult, the po lit i cal sys tem may be come un sta ble.
Al though the con cept of po lit i cal cul ture does not en com pass ex plan a tory
mech a nisms of con flicts be tween peo ple’s ori en ta tions and in sti tu tional per for -
mance, it can in di cate a mis match be tween “struc ture and cul ture” and thus be
used for prog no sis of pos si ble in sta bil ity of the po lit i cal sys tem. For un der stand -
ing of the post-com mu nist trans for ma tion, the po lit i cal cul ture ap proach pro -
vides a con cep tual frame work of anal y sis of the change in peo ple’s po lit i cal “men -
tal ity”, i.e. their per cep tions of the rules of the so ci etal game.
Types of Political Culture
Al mond and Verba de scribed three ideal types of po lit i cal cul ture: pa ro chial,
sub ject and par tic i pant. A pa ro chial po lit i cal cul ture is typ i cal of pre-mod ern so -
ci et ies whose pop u la tion has dif fuse po lit i cal-eco nomic-re li gious ori en ta tions,
hardly any knowl edge of the po lit i cal sys tem and am big u ous feel ings to wards it.
A higher aware ness of spe cial ised gov ern men tal au thor ity and more dis tinct af -
fec tive and nor ma tive po lit i cal ori en ta tions are typ i cal of the sub ject po lit i cal cul -
ture. How ever, sub jects are mostly out put-ori ented and do not con sider them -
selves as ac tive par tic i pants of the po lit i cal pro cess. A par tic i pant po lit i cal cul -
ture, in con trast, is char ac ter ised by ac tive con tri bu tion of the cit i zens to po lit i cal
life; this con tri bu tion is be ing guided by com pre hen sive po lit i cal knowledge.
In mod ern so ci et ies, par tic i pant ori en ta tions man i fest them selves in vi tal in -
ter est in lo cal and na tional pol i tics. Ac tive cit i zens per form col lec tive ac tion by
join ing or es tab lish ing civil so ci ety or gani sa tions which are known to be a pow er -
ful source of bridg ing so cial cap i tal [Putnam, 2000]. There fore, the level of de vel -
op ment of civil so ci ety (the so-called third sec tor) and its re la tion ship with the
state can serve as an im por tant in di ca tor of the par tic i pant po lit i cal cul ture.
An other typ i cal fea ture of par tic i pant ori en ta tions, which dis tin guishes
them from the pa ro chial and sub ject ones, is the sense of in di vid ual re spon si bil ity
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1 107
Political culture in Ukraine
for the sit u a tion in the coun try and com mu nity. Par tic i pants are con scious of
their role as cit i zens for the es tab lish ment of so cial or der and pro mo tion of dem o -
cratic norms. Ide ally, their sup port of dem o cratic in sti tu tions is based on re flec -
tion upon and ac cep tance of the ba sic prin ci ples of de moc racy: po lit i cal plu ral -
ism, par tic i pa tion and rep re sen ta tion, di vi sion of pow ers, and rule of law.
In fact, var i ous mix tures of the three ideal types can be ob served. The
so-called civic cul ture, which Al mond and Verba con sid ered to be the most con -
du cive to a dem o cratic po lit i cal sys tem, is a pat tern of all three types, with a dom -
i na tion of par tic i pant fea tures, while “the sub ject and pa ro chial ori en ta tions
‘man age’ or keep in place the par tic i pant po lit i cal ori en ta tions” [Al mond, Verba,
1963: p. 32].
Soviet Legacy
As po lit i cal cul ture — es pe cially the sys tem of val ues and key so cial norms —
turns out to be less prone to short-term changes than po lit i cal in sti tu tions, anal y -
sis of the trans for ma tion of po lit i cal ori en ta tions in the in de pend ent Ukraine
should be gin with the late So viet pe riod.
On the eve of the So viet Un ion’s breakup, a group of so ci ol o gists un der the
su per vi sion of Yurii Levada pub lished one of their most fa mous works, “An Or di -
nary So viet Man”, based on the anal y sis of sur vey data col lected in all 15 So viet
re pub lics be tween 1989 and 1991. Sim i lar to Al mond and Verba, Levada sug -
gested that the “qual ity of the hu man ma te rial” could to a large ex tent de ter mine
po lit i cal as well as other post-com mu nist so cial struc tures.
Ac cord ing to Levada (1993) and his re search team, the dom i nant “so -
ciocultural type of per son al ity” in the late So viet pe riod was the so-called Homo
Sovieticus. Re search ers char ac ter ised this per son al ity as a deindividualised mass
man, who holds pa ter nal is tic ori en ta tions and is “prim i tive” with re spect to his
needs. At the same time, Homo Sovieticus has mes si anic and im pe ri al is tic as pi ra -
tions and is con vinced of be ing some thing spe cial in a his tor i cal per spec tive.
By the end of the 1980s, a large share of “or di nary So viet peo ple” had been
politically social ised in the post-war and even post-Sta lin era and ex pe ri enced
a pe riod of rel a tive eco nomic pros per ity and ideo log i cal sta bil ity dur ing the
Brezhnevian Stag na tion. From the early child hood, So viet peo ple learned to be a
part of a big ger whole by par tic i pat ing in dif fer ent struc tures that were cre ated
and main tained by the state (e.g., Lit tle Octobrists, Young Pi o neers). The chan nels
of so cial mo bil ity were strictly de fined and con trolled, while in di vid ual ini tia -
tives that did not fit the all-en com pass ing frame work of the So viet state and ide -
ol ogy were sup pressed. Un der a full state man age ment of one’s life, ad ap ta tion to
es tab lished rules was less costly than at tempts to change the sit u a tion. Yet in -
stead of true loy alty, the re pres sive po lit i cal sys tem cul ti vated po lit i cal pas siv ity
and re luc tance to par tic i pate in pub lic life. Con trary to the col lec tiv ist doc trine,
the real sense of re spon si bil ity was re stricted to a fam ily cir cle and the most
trusted friends. The larg est part of re spon si bil ity for the or gani sa tion of “or di -
nary” peo ple’s life in clud ing eco nomic ac tiv i ties, hous ing, ed u ca tion etc. rested
upon the state.
In di vid u al ism — un der stood as be ing dif fer ent from oth ers — was scorned,
since it was in com pat i ble with the to tal i tar ian “one-size-fits-all ap proach” and
108 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1
Kseniia Gatskova, Maxim Gatskov
the Marx ist-Le nin ist ide ol ogy with its ab so lute truth claim. Such a con text made
plu ral ism of opin ions, in ter ests, ways of self-ex pres sion im pos si ble and fos tered
dis crep ancy be tween form and con tent of peo ple’s ac tions, be tween ar ti fi cial for -
mal and gen u ine in for mal life, be tween pro claimed and real val ues.
One of the far-reach ing con se quences of this “dou ble think” was strength en -
ing of in for mal so cial net works that, on the one hand, helped peo ple get ac cess to
scarce goods and ser vices and, on the other hand, pro vided an op por tu nity to
openly ar tic u late their per sonal views, es pe cially on po lit i cally sen si tive is sues.
On the eve of the So viet Un ion’s col lapse, Levada was go ing to ob serve the
dis so lu tion of the “per son al ity of Homo Sovieticus”, not least in the face of an
all-em brac ing in sti tu tional cri sis and im per a tives of mo der nity [Lewada, 1993:
p. 36 ff]. The end of the So viet ex per i ment marked a new pe riod of his tory for the
new in de pend ent states.
“Strong Leaders” or Political Ideologies?
For 20 years of in de pend ence, Ukraine has ex pe ri enced two large dem o crat i -
cally ori ented “rev o lu tions” (“Or ange Rev o lu tion” in 2004-2005 and the “Euro -
maidan” in 2013-2014). At the end of 2004, mass pro tests at the In de pend ence
Square in Kiev pre vented elec toral fraud and helped to launch dem o cratic re -
forms. Un for tu nately, this “rev o lu tion” failed even af ter suc cess ful con sti tu -
tional re forms, be cause fun da men tal in sti tu tions and con ven tional prac tices re -
mained un changed. Pro-dem o cratic ac tiv ists did not suc ceed in keep ing their
lead ers on the right track af ter they heaved them into power. In the year 2006,
dis agree ments within the “or ange” co ali tion re sulted in the high est level of de sire
for a strong leader that has ever been re corded in Ukraine — 65.7% (See Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “A couple of strong leaders
can do more for the country than all laws and discussions”? (%)
Source: Monitoring 1994-2014 and Public Opinion in Ukraine 2015 Databases. The data of
2015 do not include Crimea.
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1 109
Political culture in Ukraine
The di a gram shows that, dur ing the 1990s, the pro por tion of peo ple who
agreed with the state ment that “a cou ple of strong lead ers can do more for the
coun try than all laws and dis cus sions” con sid er ably in creased. In the 2000s, it re -
mained prac ti cally un changed, stand ing at nearly 60%. Nine con sec u tive years of
eco nomic de cline af ter in de pend ence had led to a sub stan tial im pov er ish ment of
the pop u la tion and dis en chant ment in the “dem o cratic dis or der”. Many peo ple
re ferred the sham bles of the 1990s to the ab sence of a strong leader – as a re sult,
pa ter nal is tic views ex pe ri enced re vival. The personalistic ap proach that “an ef -
fec tive state man ager” can com pen sate for in sti tu tional weak ness could have
been even stron ger than in the late So viet times, when there had been state in sti -
tu tions which in the face of com mu nist lead ers’ se nil ity (Brezh nev and his two
suc ces sors) made the po lit i cal sys tem work.
Strong pa ter nal is tic, leader-cen tered ori en ta tions are typ i cal of pa ro chial
and sub ject types of po lit i cal cul ture. In Ukraine, these ori en ta tions have been re -
peat edly ex ploited dur ing par lia men tary elec tion cam paigns, when po lit i cal par -
ties were formed around per sons in stead of pro grams and prin ci ples. Given a list
of po lit i cal ide ol o gies (e.g., “lib eral”, “so cial ist”, “so cial dem o cratic”, etc.) and an
op por tu nity to sug gest an other one, al most half of re spon dents — 49.3% in the
Mon i tor ing Sur vey in 2014 — had no pref er ences, had not de cided yet or sim ply
had no idea of those ide ol o gies. One year af ter the “Euromaidan”, the share of re -
spon dents with out any pref er ence in the spec trum of po lit i cal ide ol o gies de -
creased sig nif i cantly and made up 38.2%. In the year 2015, the sur vey has doc u -
mented an in crease in num ber of ad her ents of so cial dem o cratic as well as na -
tional dem o cratic forces. Still, the pro por tion of peo ple with no ideo log i cal pref -
er ences re mains very high, which is an in di ca tor of miss ing po lit i cal knowl edge
and, ap par ently, lack of in ter est in politics.
Ta ble 1
How in ter ested would you say you are in pol i tics? (%)
Ukraine Ger many Swe den France It aly Es to nia Po land Czech
Re pub lic
Very in ter -
ested 5.3 20.2 13.2 12.6 12.6 5.4 6.2 2.2
Quite in -
ter ested 27.0 44.5 45.2 30.4 31.6 35.7 33.4 19.6
Hardly in -
ter ested 43.8 29.9 30.5 36.4 35.8 43.8 42.8 49.7
Not at all
in ter ested 23.9 5.4 11.1 20.6 19.9 15.2 17.6 28.5
Source: European Social Survey 2012
In ter na tional sur veys con firm a rather low in ter est in pol i tics in Ukraine. Ac -
cord ing to the Eu ro pean So cial Sur vey, in 2012, sim i lar to other post- com mu nist
states of Cen tral Eu rope, only 5.3% of Ukrai nian re spon dents said to be very in -
ter ested and 27% to be quite in ter ested in pol i tics, whereas in West ern Eu ro pean
coun tries these fig ures were much higher (see Ta ble 1).
110 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1
Kseniia Gatskova, Maxim Gatskov
An other key el e ment of po lit i cal ori en ta tions of the Ukrai nian pop u la tion
con cerns the vec tor of for eign pol icy ori en ta tions. This vec tor does not pro vide a
clear-cut dis tinc tion be tween con ser va tive “East ern” and lib eral “West ern” val -
ues as Ukrai ni ans are of ten guided by an in tu itive sense of be long ing to a cer tain
(his tor i cally de fined) cul tural space, yet it in di cates sym pa thies ei ther with con -
sol i dated au thor i tar ian re gimes of Putin’s Rus sia and Lukashenka’s Belarus or
with the dem o cratic com mu nity of EU coun tries.
Fig ure 2. How do you re gard the idea of Ukraine’s join ing…
the Un ion of Rus sia and Belarus? ... the Eu ro pean Un ion? (%)
Source: Mon i tor ing 1994-2014 and Pub lic Opin ion in Ukraine 2015 Da ta bases. The data of
2015 do not in clude Cri mea.
The “Euromaidan” pro tests and sub se quent an nex ation of Cri mea by the
Rus sian Fed er a tion along with Rus sia’s ac tive in volve ment in the armed con flict
in Donbas led to a re ori en ta tion of many Ukrai ni ans from East to West. In 2010,
61.6% of the Ukraine’s pop u la tion re garded the per spec tive of Ukraine’s join ing
the Un ion of Rus sia and Belarus pos i tively; while in 2015 the pic ture was quite
the re verse: 62.1% of re spon dents re jected this op tion. At the same time, sup port
of West ern in te gra tion (join ing the Eu ro pean Un ion) be came more pop u lar: it
in creased from 45.6% in 2010 to 56.3% in 2015 (See Fig. 2).
Tol er ance and Plu ral ism
Be ing tol er ant to those who are dif fer ent, re spect ing the rights of mi nor i ties
and ac cept ing com plex ity of a so cial en vi ron ment are im por tant dem o cratic at ti -
tudes and val ues. Em pir i cal re searches have shown that tol er ance is as so ci ated
with eco nomic growth. Open so ci et ies are more at trac tive to peo ple with dif fer -
ent back grounds and pro vide the most fa vour able en vi ron ment for cre ativ ity and
in no va tion. A to tal i tar ian state, which sup presses not only po lit i cal op po si tion,
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1 111
Political culture in Ukraine
but also — as far as pos si ble — all kinds of pluralism, fosters intolerance and
one-sided thinking.
Many Ukrai ni ans ex pe ri enced both the mo nop oly of the Com mu nist Party
and a great di ver sity of po lit i cal par ties and move ments af ter 1991. Po lit i cal plu -
ral ism was a new, so far un fa mil iar phe nom e non to the post-So viet states. The
grow ing di ver sity of the po lit i cal spec trum per plexed in ex pe ri enced vot ers who
tried to adapt to the new con di tions when many par ties were formed around po -
lit i cal en tre pre neurs pursuing their personal economic interests.
There fore, it is not sur pris ing that the share of re spon dents who did not sup -
port a mul ti party sys tem in Ukraine grew sig nif i cantly in the 1990s and stood at
nearly 45% af ter the failed “Or ange Rev o lu tion” (See Fig. 3).
Fig ure 3. Do you think Ukraine needs a mul ti party sys tem? (%)
Source: Mon i tor ing 1994-2014 and Pub lic Opin ion in Ukraine 2015 Da ta bases. The data of
2015 do not in clude Cri mea.
Re jec tion of the mul ti party sys tem may be, to a large ex tent, at trib uted to
cha otic pol i tics and a per ma nent cri sis of the po lit i cal sys tem, to eco nomic hard -
ships dur ing trans for ma tion as well as to the “af ter-ef fect” of So viet socia li sa tion,
while a high pro por tion of those who could not (or did not want to) give a def i nite
an swer most likely in di cates dis in ter est in po lit i cal life and political alienation.
Once the “Euromaidan” put an end to the au thor i tar ian and crim i nal re gime
of Viktor Yanukovych, the share of pro po nents of po lit i cal plu ral ism be gan to
grow again and reached 36% in 2015 (nearly the same fig ure had been re corded in
1994).
Mass Pro tests vs. Civil So ci ety En gage ment
In the au tumn of 2013, ac tiv ists started to dem on strate against Pres i dent
Yanukovych’s re fusal to sign the EU As so ci a tion Agree ment. Dem on stra tions
112 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1
Kseniia Gatskova, Maxim Gatskov
rap idly trans formed into a pro test of pop u la tion against the gov ern ment, which
lost its le git i macy in the eyes of pro test ers by vi o lently break ing up the peace ful
dem on stra tion. The “Rev o lu tion of Dig nity” firmly stood for Eu ro pean (i.e.
West ern, dem o cratic) val ues: rule of law, non-oli gar chic mar ket economy, wel -
fare state and civil society.
Ac cord ing to sur veys con ducted by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the Na tional
Acad emy of Sci ences of Ukraine, al most one fifth of the Ukrai nian pop u la tion
took part in the mass pro tests in their city or sup ported the pro test ers by pro vid -
ing food, warm clothes or money. The “Euromaidan” pro test ers were on av er age
youn ger, more of ten self-em ployed and con sid er ably better ed u cated than the
gen eral pop u la tion of Ukraine (See Fig. 4).
The five most of ten men tioned de mands of pro test ers in cluded: re lease of ar -
rested dem on stra tors and end of re pres sions, res ig na tion of the Pres i dent Yanu -
kovych and con duct ing a new pres i den tial elec tion, res ig na tion of the gov ern -
ment as well as crim i nal pros e cu tion of cor rupt pol i ti cians and those who were re -
spon si ble for vi o lence against pro test ers [Ukraine-Analysen 2013]. Ap par ently,
the “Rev o lu tion of Dig nity” was made pri mar ily by those rep re sen ta tives of
Ukrai nian so ci ety who were not ready to tolerate the authoritarian corrupt
regime anymore.
Fig ure 4. Ed u ca tional level of the gen eral pop u la tion and of the “Euromaidan” par tic i pants
Source: Mon i tor ing 2014 and the “Euromaidan” Sur vey 7-8.12.2013.
The “Euromaidan” pro tests and sub se quent armed con flict in the Donbas re -
gion have had a great con sol i dat ing and co he sive ef fect on many Ukrai ni ans. A
new so cial move ment oc curred as a re ac tion of the pop u la tion to a dif fi cult sit u a -
tion in the East of Ukraine: peo ple started to found nu mer ous vol un teer or gani sa -
tions and launch ini tia tives that sup ported the Ukrai nian army, pro vided help to
in ter nally dis placed cit i zens from the east ern re gions and per formed other so cial
and po lit i cal ac tiv i ties. Dur ing the last year, 44% of Ukrai nian cit i zens ei ther
sup ported vol un teer or gani sa tions and ini tia tives or pro vided fi nan cial help to
Ukrai nian army through the gov ern men tal chan nel [Pub lic Opin ion in Ukraine
2015]. The data show that peo ple do nated money or pro vided in-kind sup port
(food, clothes, med i cine, etc.) more ac tively than per son ally en gaged in vol un -
teer ac tiv i ties (See Fig. 5). Ap prox i mately 30% of Ukraine’s pop u la tion do nated
money to vol un teers in the last 12 months, while 7% transferred money via SMS
to the specially created account of the Ministry of Defense.
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1 113
Political culture in Ukraine
Fig ure 5. Vol un teer ac tiv i ties and sup port of Ukrai nian army
Source: Pub lic Opin ion in Ukraine 2015 Da ta base. The data do not in clude Cri mea.
Al though en gage ment in vol un teer ac tiv i ties may not be con sid ered ubiq ui -
tous (only 3.2% of peo ple per formed vol un teer ac tiv i ties ei ther in the re gion of
mil i tary con flict or out side it: in hos pi tals, ref u gee sup port groups, etc.), this new
phe nom e non is very im por tant for Ukraine be cause it strength ens the civil so ci -
ety. Vol un teers dem on strate self-or gani sa tional skills and abil ity to ef fec tively
solve var i ous ur gent prob lems. Be sides, vol un teer or gani sa tions help to fos ter
personal activism and social responsibility of citizens.
There are two ma jor types of civic ac tiv ism in Ukraine: par tic i pa tion in mass
pro tests and en gage ment in civil so ci ety or gani sa tions. They only par tially over -
lap: 17% of cit i zens par tic i pated in the “Euromaidan” ei ther by pro test ing or pro -
vid ing food, clothes or money while only 13% of Ukrai ni ans were mem bers of
civil so ci ety or gani sa tions at that time [Mon i tor ing Sur vey, 2014]. Among the
“Euromaidan” par tic i pants 73.9% did not be long to any civil so ci ety or gani sa -
tion. De spite the fact that al most ev ery fifth cit i zen par tic i pated in the “Euro -
maidan”, po lit i cal ac tiv ism of pro test ers seems to be of a short-term na ture. Mass
pro tests were a spon ta ne ous re ac tion (which is op posed to ac tion) whereas en -
gage ment in vol un teer or gani sa tions has more to do with planned and en dur ing
so cial ac tiv ity [Gatskova, Gatskov, 2015]. Yet only a long-term en gage ment of
cit i zens in civil society organisations can actually be conducive to the participant
political culture.
Con clu sions and Rec om men da tions
What in the pub lic dis course is of ten re ferred to as “na tional char ac ter” or
“men tal ity”, can be sci en tif i cally cap tured by the con cept of po lit i cal cul ture.
This con cept helps to ex plain re form fail ures and — more gen er ally — po lit i cal in -
sta bil ity by ana lys ing ri gid ity of po lit i cal orientations of the population.
Re con struc tion of Ukrai ni ans’ po lit i cal ori en ta tions on the ba sis of sur vey
data for the last two de cades pro duces a pic ture that is far from be ing com fort ing
and prom is ing. “Par tic i pant” and other pro-dem o cratic ori en ta tions con sti tute a
mi nor part of the pop u la tion’s po lit ico-cul tural pat tern, es pe cially in East ern
Ukraine. On the timeline, no ta ble changes in in di vid ual at ti tudes and na tional
114 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1
Kseniia Gatskova, Maxim Gatskov
pat terns of po lit i cal ori en ta tions oc curred in the af ter math of ma jor po lit i cal and
eco nomic events and not prior to them. The ma jor ity of Ukraine’s pop u la tion
avoids ac tive po lit i cal par tic i pa tion and re mains out put-ori ented, which may
facilitate persistence of an authoritarian political regime.
How ever, it is im por tant to keep in mind that Ukrai ni ans have never lived in
a con sol i dated de moc racy since po lit i cal sys tem of the in de pend ent Ukraine has
al ways been more or less au thor i tar ian, and that only a neg li gi ble share of the
pop u la tion had ex pe ri ence of liv ing abroad in a West ern dem o cratic so ci ety. As a
re sult, many Ukrai ni ans have a very vague and some times ex tremely dis torted
idea of de moc racy, so they hardly know what are dem o cratic prin ci ples, in sti tu -
tions and procedures like.
As R.J. Dal ton and Ch. Welzel noted, par tic i pants in the true sense may be
“ab sent not only be cause the sys tem would re press them but also be cause the cit i -
zens have not learned the role model of a par tic i pant cit i zen” [Dal ton, Welzel,
2014: p. 5]. Hav ing no tra di tion of par tic i pant po lit i cal cul ture, peo ple in Ukraine
tend to re pro duce well-known mech a nisms of so cial in ter ac tion from the So viet
and early post-So viet past. In con trast to con sol i dated de moc ra cies where new
gen er a tions al most au to mat i cally learn how “de moc racy works”, in coun tries
with no dem o cratic tra di tions like Ukraine these mechanisms have to be learned
by other means.
One of the most im por tant sources of dem o cratic plu ral ism is cer tainly
Ukraine’s re gional di ver sity which made it im pos si ble for any power elite to be -
come the only op tion in the last two de cades. De spite be ing fraught with con flict,
re gional di ver sity cre ates a fa vour able en vi ron ment for learn ing how to deal with
eth no-lin guis tic, re li gious and cul tural dif fer ences and thus to be come more tol -
er ant. This pro cess may be ac cel er ated through pro mo tion of Ukrai ni ans’ in ter -
nal mo bil ity by im prov ing trans port and tour ism in fra struc ture, as well as
through de vel op ment of na tional student (including high school) exchange
programs, etc.
For mal ed u ca tion is an other im por tant chan nel for form ing po lit i cal cul ture:
high schools and uni ver si ties should pro vide ef fec tive po lit i cal and civic ed u ca -
tion for their stu dents, as well as pro mote ex change pro grams with stu dents from
dem o cratic coun tries. Uni ver si ties should have more ac a demic free dom and au -
ton omy. Be sides, Eu ro pean and Amer i can foun da tions could carry out a five to
ten-year pro gram for fos ter ing stu dent self-ad min is tra tion at Ukrai nian uni ver -
si ties. It is im por tant, though, to closely co op er ate with the Min is try of Ed u ca -
tion in this mat ter and to care fully mon i tor the re sults in order to avoid adverse
effect described above as “form without content”.
At the level of civil so ci ety, it would be ad vis able to partly re ad dress fi nan cial
as sis tance to Ukraine, which aims to fur ther de vel op ment of the third sec tor. It
may turn out that it is more ef fec tive to give money to those who are ready to vol -
un teer than to pro fes sion als who are pur su ing an al ter na tive ca reer in the third
sec tor. The fo cus of fi nan cial and in sti tu tional aid should be less on over all and
pro fes sional pro mo tion of de moc ra ti sa tion but more on pro jects that can im prove
the qual ity of life. Al though these pro jects deal with “smaller” is sues, peo ple will
di rectly per ceive their ben e fi cial out comes. This, in turn, may en cour age in volve -
ment in vol un tary sec tor and thereby promote democratisation in the medium
and long run.
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 1 115
Political culture in Ukraine
With re gard to po lit i cal com pe ti tion and rep re sen ta tion, the ex ist ing po lit i -
cal par ties ought to de velop a sharper “ideo log i cal” pro file in stead of be ing pa ter -
nal is tic or leader-cen tered (P. Poroshenko, V. Klychko, O. Liashko, etc.) po lit i -
cal en ter prises. Among all of Ukraine’s po lit i cal par ties the cri sis-tested Bat’kiv -
shchyna (“Fa ther land”) and a young party Samopomich (“Self-Re li ance”) seem
most promising in this respect.
At the level of state in sti tu tions, dem o cratic part ners of Ukraine should
main tain pres sure on the cen tral state power to be come more trans par ent and
del e gate more func tions to re gional and lo cal bod ies. Be sides, it should not be for -
got ten that with out a truly in de pend ent and cor rup tion-free ju di ciary even “par -
tic i pant” cit i zens will never learn to respect the rule of law.
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Kseniia Gatskova, Maxim Gatskov
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