The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
The paper discusses the main problems of the national political elite and specific features of their functioning. Special attention is paid to the process of coming into being of Ukraine s political elite, which is described in the context of formation of the Ukrainian statehood.
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irk-123456789-1819902021-12-09T01:26:12Z The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis Pylypenko, V. Privalov, Yu. The paper discusses the main problems of the national political elite and specific features of their functioning. Special attention is paid to the process of coming into being of Ukraine s political elite, which is described in the context of formation of the Ukrainian statehood. 2016 Article The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis / V. Pylypenko, Yu. Privalov // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. — 2016. — № 3. — С. 171-190. — англ. 1563-4426 http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/181990 321.015, 329.05 en Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг Iнститут соціології НАН України |
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The paper discusses the main problems of the national political elite and specific features of their functioning. Special attention is paid to the process of coming into being of Ukraine s political elite, which is described in the context of formation of the Ukrainian statehood. |
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Pylypenko, V. Privalov, Yu. |
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Pylypenko, V. Privalov, Yu. The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг |
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Pylypenko, V. Privalov, Yu. |
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Pylypenko, V. |
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis |
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis |
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis |
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis |
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis |
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political elite of ukraine: historical and sociological analysis |
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Iнститут соціології НАН України |
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis / V. Pylypenko, Yu. Privalov // Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг. — 2016. — № 3. — С. 171-190. — англ. |
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Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг |
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2025-07-15T23:54:55Z |
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Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
VALERII PYLYPENKO,UDC 321.015, 329.05
Doctor of Sciences in Sociology, Principal Re -
search Fellow of the Department of History and
Theory of Sociology, Institute of Sociology of the
NAS of Ukraine
YURII PRYVALOV,
Candidate of Sciences in Philosophy, Senior Re -
search Fellow of the Social Expertise Depart -
ment, Institute of Sociology of the NAS of Ukraine
The Political Elite of Ukraine:
Historical and Sociological Analysis
Abstract
The paper discusses the main problems of the national political elite and specific
features of their functioning. Special attention is paid to the process of coming into
being of Ukraine’s political elite, which is described in the context of formation of the
Ukrainian statehood.
Keywords: elite, politics, state, government, political parties, political activity, analysis
Orig i nally in French, the word “elite” meant just a choice. But later this word
was used to des ig nate ex cep tional (top qual ity) prod ucts and also mil i tary or sec -
u lar elite that had been es tab lished in a so ci ety. Their po si tions were so strong
and mean ing ful that seemed un likely to evoke any doubt.
The pi o neers of mod ern elite stud ies Ital ian so cial sci en tists Gaetano Mosca
and Vilfredo Pareto noted that in the pe riod be tween the late 19th and early 20th
cen tu ries in Eu rope class con fron ta tions were re placed by steady re mote ness of
rul ing cir cles, or mer i toc racy as so ci ated with them (per sons and fam i lies pos sess -
ing a high so cial sta tus due to or i gin, for tune, ad min is tra tive or eco nomic power
and in flu ence, in tel li gence, tal ents, spir i tual au thor ity, etc.) from the rest of the
pop u la tion. The pop u la tion be comes poorly dif fer en ti ated mass, which only can
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 171
flock af ter the elite, sup port it or “un seat”, but in any case it will have to en coun -
ter a new rule of the mi nor ity.
Ideo log i cally, the con cept of elite has al ways been ul tra-con ser va tive and
anti-rad i cal, which seems hardly to be com pat i ble with dem o cratic ide als. Yet the
ex is tence of an elite stra tum se lected in a par tic u lar mo ment in a rel a tively sta ble
so cial en vi ron ment is an in dis put able so cio log i cal fact. Re search ers of the elite
phe nom e non in mod ern coun tries — both crit ics and apol o gists — are con cerned
not so much about the ex is tence of the “se lect” (who con trol ev ery one ow ing to
their po si tion) as about trends in their re newal, whether they closed or open to
new com pe ten cies, tal ents, mer its or cap i tal, which in their turn should be en -
sured by dem o cratic mech a nisms.
For ex am ple, the Span ish phi los o pher Jose Ortega y Gasset was wor ried
about pos si bil ity of “the re volt of the masses” and de struc tion of the very foun da -
tions of the elite’s ex is tence in the 1930s, while the rad i cal Amer i can so ci ol o gist
Charles Wright Mills high lighted the grow ing ri gid ity and clo sure of the US
“gov ern ing elite” in the 1950s.
V. Pareto no ticed the dif fer ence be tween gov ern ing and non-gov ern ing elite.
The first one seems to eas ily change it self un der dem o cratic con di tions. In er tia of
the sec ond one is higher; be sides, it is formed in other ways. Money and po lit i cal
mach i na tions are only some of the mech a nisms that sup port the elite’s dom i -
nance.
The mer its are de ter mined by ed u ca tional back ground, pro fes sional achieve -
ments, loy alty to pub lic duty and vo ca tion, tal ents and spir i tual power, pub lic
opin ion and rec og ni tion. At ti tudes to wards the elite also vary from cul ture to
cul ture. The prob lem of for ma tion and trans for ma tion of the na tional po lit i cal
elite of Ukraine in the 21st cen tury is con sid ered to be one of the most “Eu ro -
pean” and press ing prob lems of the pres ent-day so ci ol ogy and po lit i cal sci ence,
which has also been con firmed by both re cent so cial prac tices and events un -
folded in Ukraine’s po lit i cal spec trum.
The pro cess of for ma tion of the na tional po lit i cal elite, which started in
1988–1989, has not fin ished yet. There fore, the po lit i cal elite have been un der go -
ing con stant changes in re cent de cades. These changes are rather grad ual than
dra matic. They oc cur through the pro cess of mu ta tion within some groups or
their mix ing with other ones, as well as through changes in po lit i cal slo gans and
lead er ship. Ba si cally, the pro cess of for ma tion of Ukraine’s po lit i cal (rul ing) elite
can be di vided into the fol low ing stages [Shul’ha, 2011].
The first ma jor stage lasted from 1989 to 1994. It was char ac ter ised by si mul -
ta neous ex is tence of both “old” so viet elite and “new” na tional one, which had
just be gun form ing. At that time, the old elite’s po lit i cal and ad min is tra tive cap i -
tal was be ing con verted into eco nomic one. Fur ther more, fi nan cial cap i tal was
be ing ac cu mu lated in the hands of crime bosses. Pri vate me dia, which were get -
ting es tab lished in that pe riod, served as a ba sis for le git i mat ing big pri vate prop -
erty. Try ing to jus tify the un just re dis tri bu tion of prop erty, Ukrai nian in tel lec tu -
als (mainly socio-hu man is tic) high lighted the fact that there were no al ter na -
tives to re forms and Ukraine as an in de pend ent state needed re con struc tion; al -
though their speeches were noth ing but rhet o ric.
Dur ing the sec ond stage (1994–2000), the three main groups of Ukraine’s
po lit i cal elite (the old rul ing, the new rul ing and the crim i nal) con tin ued to ac cu -
172 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
mu late cap i tal in their hands. The shadow econ omy rap idly de vel oped, ma fia
bosses joined the power elite, and the ma jor oli gar chic clans (from Dnipro -
petrovs’k1, Donets’k and Kyiv) came into be ing. The rep re sen ta tives of po lit i cal
elite be gan both to con front each other and fight over con trol of the cen tral
power.
Dur ing the third stage (2000–2004), the above-men tioned groups (the old,
the new and the crim i nal) were merged into one named pro-Kuchma group. The
lat ter served as a ba sis for pow er ful oli gar chic clans, where power and prop erty
fuse with each other. The rul ing elite are criminalised while the crim i nal elite are
respectalised.
The fourth stage (late 2004) meant that a part of the oli gar chic elite and big
busi ness own ers be came ma ture enough to get rid of the pa tron age of se nior gov -
ern ment of fi cials and thus of il le gal re dis tri bu tion of in come (be tween them and
gov ern ment of fi cials) through the mech a nism of cor rup tion. Dur ing the 2004
pres i den tial elec tion a cleav age be tween the two com pet ing groups of power elite
deep ened even fur ther and even tu ally grew into con fron ta tion.
The pe riod from 2005 to 2010 (known as the reign of Viktor Yushchenko)
can ac tu ally be re garded as the fifth stage of de vel op ment of the na tional rul ing
elite. The most im por tant event of that pe riod was the “Or ange Rev o lu tion”,
which man aged to in spire hope in Ukrai ni ans. Un for tu nately, their ex pec ta tions
ended up in dis ap point ment.
Fi nally, the sixth stage (since 2010) be gan with the reign of Viktor Yanu -
kovych, who was the chief rep re sen ta tive of the “Donets’k clan”. It is a well-
known fact that Yanukovych’s rule was in ter rupted by the “Rev o lu tion of Dig -
nity” and ended up with his es cape to Rus sia where he was taken un der the wing
of Vladi mir Putin.
A more de tailed anal y sis of for ma tion of the na tional po lit i cal elite has re -
vealed their con ti nu ity as the most es sen tial fea ture. In 1996, for ex am ple, 75% of
the old com mu nist nomenklatura2 worked in the new power struc tures. There -
fore, con ti nu ity of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite is mostly en sured by their “no -
menklatura” or i gin.
The pro cess of elite cir cu la tion took place on the ba sis of “Kyiv-cen trism”
and dom i nance of “Dnipropetrovians” in all of the power struc tures dur ing the
Brezhniev — Shcherbyts’kyi era. Elite re cruit ment un der the rule of Volodymyr
Shcherbyts’kyi was not open to the pub lic; in stead, it was a semi-closed pro cess.
A fu ture leader had to go through all ca reer stages. But in the early 1980s op por -
tu ni ties for pro mo tion were re stricted ow ing to “geron to cracy” of so viet power
elite and ab sence of changes within them. Top po si tions in the nomenklatura
were given for a life time. More over, the party elite were “afraid” of com pe ti tion
and there fore they used to re cruit those who would be just “per form ers”. At the
be gin ning of “peres troika”, sev eral at tempts were made to re ju ve nate the elite:
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 173
The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
1 Since 19 May 2016 Dnipropetrovs’k has officially been named Dnipro.
2 The word “nomenklatura” is derived from the term “nomenclature” (which in turn means a
system for giving names to things within a particular profession or field) and used to designate
a population stratum in the states of former socialist camp, which occupied various key
administrative positions in the Communist Party, central and local authorities, as well as in the
spheres of industry, agriculture, education and health care.
about 25% were re placed by new cad res while the “old” staff was “trans ferred” to
other po si tions. Kin ship and fam ily ties, be long ing to the same re gion and loy alty
to chief served as a ba sis for the elite’s ro ta tion at that time.
In 1989, an other source of elite re cruit ment — elec tion — was in tro duced
within the so viet po lit i cal sys tem. But that source was not al ways better than se -
lec tion within the nomenklatura. Ca reer ists, bribe tak ers and crim i nals came to
power quite of ten. It should be noted that the year 1989 was marked by the emer -
gence of a po lit i cal “coun ter-elite”, which as pired to power be cause of its com mit -
ment to a mar ket econ omy. Ac qui si tion of pub lic cap i tal, emer gence of poorly
con trolled busi ness and dis in te gra tion of the CPSU mono lith un der pres sure
from a new gen er a tion of pol i ti cians also started in 1989. Be sides, Ukraine’s
“coun ter-elite” be gan ac tively form ing just at that time (at first, they gath ered
around the Ukrai nian Culturological Club). The re nowned Ukrai nian poet Ivan
Drach, who a short time later be came a na tional dem o crat, noted that the club
“should be treated” as an as so ci a tion of for mer po lit i cal pris on ers [Lytvyn, 1994].
In deed, most mem bers of the club were for merly dis si dents; there fore, they had
no chance of en ter ing the elite of “peres troika”. In 1988, the Ukrai nian Hel sinki
Un ion (UHU) re started its ac tiv ity. UHU was an overtly anti-com mu nist or -
gani sa tion whose lead ers had been in prison camps or ex ile for many years.
At the party meet ing held in No vem ber 1988, Kyiv writ ers formed a group to
fa vour “peres troika”. Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko, who were for merly an -
tag o nists of dis si dence, joined the group. It was called “Peo ple’s Move ment of
Ukraine for Re con struc tion”1 (“Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy za perebudovu”). The
group con sisted only of the Com mu nist Party mem bers (among them were such
fa mous fig ures as Oleh Yemets’, Volodymyr Yavorivs’kyi, Borys Oliinyk, Pavlo
Movchan, Yurii Mushketyk), who from then on be came fight ers for “Gor -
bachev’s path”.
When Mikhail Gorbachev vis ited Kyiv in Feb ru ary 1989, he met with
Rukh’s found ers, which was a sig nif i cant po lit i cal sup port since “Kyiv au thor i -
ties” had al ready adopted a res o lu tion de clar ing the es tab lish ment of that group
“il le git i mate”. The fact that the Ukrai nian in tel li gen tsia en joyed Gorbachev’s
sup port in di cated the end of the rule of Shcherbyts’kyi’s group in the Com mu nist
Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the be gin ning of “chaos” in the elite. The writ ers,
who were known as rep re sen ta tives of cul tural elite, be came the ma jor ide olo gists
com pet ing with Kyiv nomenklatura’s elite, where mis un der stand ing was also
hap pen ing.
In the spring of 1989, Ukrai nian “coun ter-elites” united. Writ ers and ac a -
demic cir cles, which de manded “deep en ing of peres troika” and fol lowed the ex -
am ple of Mos cow, al lied them selves with a UHU’s “dis si dent” elite and cul tural
or gani sa tion “Tovarystvo Leva” (“The Lion So ci ety”)2. In 1991, Viacheslav
Chornovil noted that these two move ments “are stick ing to gether at the mo -
ment, which al lows a rel a tively small num ber of peo ple to di rect the na tional
dem o cratic move ment in Ukraine”.
174 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
1 Also known as “Popular Movement of Ukraine for Reconstruction”.
2 The organisation was established in L’viv, which is also often called the City of Lion(s).
The elite of NRU (“Peo ple’s Move ment of Ukraine”) have gone a long way
from strug gle against pres i den tial struc tures to sup port for the pres i dent as a
guar an tor of na tion hood and im ple men ta tion of re forms. Among all of the po lit i -
cal par ties and as so ci a tions es tab lished dur ing that pe riod, the Peo ple’s Move -
ment was the only one po lit i cal force that was able to con duct its own pol icy. In
April 1991, the Great Coun cil of the Move ment stated that a per son can not be
both a mem ber of the NRU and a Com mu nist Party mem ber. The 2nd Meet ing of
the Peo ple’s Move ment showed that the or gani sa tion be gan be ing radi cal ised as
it had re pu di ated a prom ise to co op er ate with the Com mu nist Party and stopped
talk ing about so cial ism. “Writ ers” as old lead ers of the Move ment were grad u ally
re placed by “dis si dents”: most par tic i pants ex pressed their will to elect Mykhailo
Horyn’ as the NRU leader in stead of Ivan Drach. Be sides, Myroslav Popovich,
who was one of the NRU found ers, had left the or gani sa tion, which in flu enced
the pro cess of its radi cal is ation even more. The Move ment be gan to rely on
anti-So viet-minded Galician peo ple (from West Ukraine) rather than on the
“Kyiv in tel li gen tsia”.
The year 1991 be gan with the so-called “pre sen ti ment of dic ta tor ship”. Dra -
matic events in the Bal tic re pub lics, which were hap pen ing at that time, urged
the Com mu nist Party to be gin prep a ra tions for a coun ter-of fen sive. In Au gust
1991, a group of eight high-rank ing gov ern ment of fi cials (called the State Com -
mit tee on the State of Emer gency, or GKChP) made a coup d’etat at tempt, which
is known as the Kremlin “putsch”. The Peo ple’s Coun cil1 and the Peo ple’s Move -
ment of Ukraine called the na tion to with stand “com mu nist im pe ri al ism’s” at -
tempts to re write his tory and bring Ukrai ni ans to their knees. The re sis tance
bases were cre ated in West ern Ukraine and in the city of Kyiv. The Na tional
Dem o crats got a real chance to seize the power (by tak ing it away from the Com -
mu nist Party of Ukraine) and start a re sis tance move ment against putschists.
The proc la ma tion of Ukraine’s in de pend ence in Au gust 1991 was pos si ble
be cause of con fu sion in the gov ern ment, in ac tiv ity of the Com mu nist Party and
in tense pres sure from na tional dem o cratic forces. In or der to re tain power in
Ukraine, the rul ing elite made an in stant de ci sion to de clare in de pend ence, thus
se cur ing them selves against heated crit i cism of their op po nents.
The au tumn of 1991 be came a cru cial mo ment in Ukraine’s his tory as Ukrai -
ni ans had to de cide the fate of their state and “elect” the elite. Be ing daz zled by
“sud den” vic tory of the Au gust 1991, new na tional dem o cratic lead ers, as well as
lead ers of other par ties and move ments were un able to prop erly eval u ate the cur -
rent po lit i cal sit u a tion and ra tio of the “East ern” worldview to “West ern” one in
Ukrai nian pub lic opin ion. Im me di ately af ter “Au gust vic tory”, when the for mer
“coun ter-elite” sud denly (and for a short time) got an op por tu nity to be a part of
the po lit i cal elite of in de pend ent Ukraine, they dem on strated their in abil ity to
act within “big pol i tics”. There was no lon ger unity be tween their mem bers,
which used to be their main ad van tage.
Be cause of their “po lit i cal na ivety” the Na tional Dem o crats were forced out
of the na tional bour geoi sie, which had just started form ing. Be long ing to the era
of “po lit i cal ro man ti cism” (1989–1991), they nei ther al lowed them selves to es -
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 175
The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
1 At that time, the People’s Council (“Narodna Rada”) was a parliamentary opposition.
tab lish any con tacts with crim i nal busi ness nor beat a path to “red di rec tors’1
door”, who could ac tu ally spon sor the elec tion cam paign. The na tional dem o -
cratic elite only re lied on en thu si asm and de vo tion of the masses, as well as Ukrai -
nian di as pora’s in for ma tion sup port and spon sor ship, which would be enough, for
ex am ple, for Lviv re gion, but not for the whole of Ukraine. Ukraine’s dem o cratic
move ment even tu ally split into three di rec tions: rad i cal (Levko Luk’yanenko),
dem o cratic, which was the clos est to the Peo ple’s Move ment (Viacheslav Chor -
novil) and mod er ate lib eral (Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi). It should be noted that some
econ o mists and di rec tors thought that Ihor Yukhnovs’kyi would be a “lesser evil”
if the so ci ety was be com ing radi cal ised. In gen eral, that part of the po lit ico-eco -
nomic elite was not con fi dent in its strength and abil ity to in flu ence the masses;
they did not pro pose any one who could be an ad vo cate of re forms and pri -
vatisation.
The elite that had been formed by the au tumn of 1991 were guided by the idea
of state hood (taken over from the Peo ple’s Move ment) and con cept of mar ket
trans for ma tions adopted from the Dem o crats and some bour geois ide olo gists.
Be ing left with out orig i nal oppositional ide ol ogy, the Na tional Dem o crats failed
to cre ate a new one and so had to co op er ate with the cen tral power for the sake of
build ing Ukraine as an in de pend ent state. Their dreams of man ag ing that pro cess
re mained un at tain able. Most of the par ties emerged in Ukraine were closer to the
so-called “pres sure groups”, to protoparties which were or gani sa tion ally weak,
had no clear pro grams, tended to be pop u list and en joyed sup port from a rel a -
tively small group of peo ple.
The for mer “coun ter-elite” be came de moc ra tised in late 1991 be cause the
state nomenklatura (which fol lowed Leonid Kravchuk) had in ter cepted their
slo gans (for in de pend ence, de moc racy and mar ket econ omy). A cer tain part of
the op po si tion be lieved (or was forced to be lieve) that the nomenklatura had re -
ally re thought its pri or i ties and so com mu nist func tion ar ies had sud denly be -
come the na tional elite. But that step meant de feat of na tional forces since they
re fused to fight for the lead er ship in the in de pend ent Ukraine and over the mem -
ber ship in the state elite. Af ter the Com mu nist Party’s col lapse and ban, there
emerged a “party in power” as the main fo cus of the po lit i cal elite. That party
acted not pub licly but “be hind the scenes”, there fore it was dif fi cult to iden tify.
In 1991, the “party of power” clus tered around Leonid Kravchuk and some times
tried to unite “heteropolar forces” which shared a com mon or i gin (as they came
from the nomenklatura). There were the so-called “na tional com mu nists”, the
Dem o crats (more over, some of them did not have a cer tain po lit i cal ori en ta tion
while oth ers still had Com mu nist Party cards), mem bers of the Party of Dem o -
cratic Re vival of Ukraine (PDVU), which had been just cre ated, some di rec tors
of large in dus trial en ter prises and those who held key po si tions in the Agro-In -
dus trial Com plex — prag mat i cally minded po lit i cal forces, who liked call ing
them selves “re form ers” (al though some of them were re ally in ter ested in re -
forms).
176 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
1 Persons who held a position of a head or deputy head of a state-owned enterprise in the
Soviet Union.
The pe riod from the au tumn of 1991 to the spring of 1992 can be de scribed as
a con flict-free pe riod in the life of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite. At that time, pro vin -
cial elite, which con sisted mainly of Com mu nists, were grad u ally trans formed
into the state elite. For many po lit i cal forces, it was a pe riod of con fu sion and ex -
pec ta tions, un re solved fates and missed op por tu ni ties. Zbigniew Brzezinski once
char ac ter ised the pro cesses that oc curred then in Ukraine’s po lit i cal life and were
linked to a multi-party sys tem as “chaos” in the elite (the first phase of post-com -
mu nist trans for ma tion), as sur ing that it would not last lon ger than five years
[Brzezinski, 1994: p. 7].
Thus, from 1989 to1994 the So viet so ci ety un der went fun da men tal changes
that led to the fall of the USSR, proc la ma tion of Ukraine’s in de pend ence, emer -
gence of a multi-party sys tem and dis so lu tion of the CPSU — CPU. The next
stage was for ma tion of “cap i tal ist re la tions”. Global trans for ma tions were di -
rected by a new elite that had “sprouted” from the old one but com pletely re -
nounced its ide ol ogy, hav ing adopted the ide ol ogy of coun ter-elite in stead. It was
an un prec e dented po lit i cal pro cess in the his tory of Ukraine, which hap pened be -
cause of some dis ad van tages of the coun ter-elite. The lat ter, be ing dis united, or -
gani sa tion ally weak and non-ag gres sive by na ture, could not find strength to
fight, nor did they ever plan to do it.
In 1994, Ukrai ni ans had to make a choice again. The old power with the first
pres i dent Leonid Kravchuk at their head had lost a vote of con fi dence. “Krav -
chuk’s team” could nei ther fix Ukraine’s eco nomic cri sis nor pre vent frag men ta -
tion in the po lit i cal en vi ron ment. There fore, it was de cided to hold an early pres i -
den tial elec tion in June 1994.
The “left ists” — the old po lit i cal elite — nom i nated Oleksandr Moroz as a
pres i den tial can di date. Volodymyr Lanovyi, the Pres i dent of the Cen tre for Mar -
ket Re forms, was the “right wing” nom i nee. At that time, the “rightists” rounded
up pol i ti cians who shared na tion al ist views, pa tri otic re form ers and en tre pre -
neurs. “New” bu reau cratic elite, i. e. the “party in power”, pro posed two can di -
dates — the Pres i dent of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and the Speaker of the
Verkhovna Rada (Ukrai nian par lia ment) Ivan Pliushch. But Kravchuk’s main
ri val in that pres i den tial race was Leonid Kuchma, who had be gun to pre pare for
vic tory 18 months ear lier, as the then Prime Min is ter. Kuchma was backed by
pow er ful groups of in dus tri al ists, busi ness men and “prag matic” re form ist forces
that com peted with the cen tral elite (the nomenklatura). In fact, re gions of
Ukraine op posed the Cen tre. Both or di nary Ukrai ni ans and most of the elite
voted for Kuchma. Hav ing be come the sec ond Pres i dent of Ukraine, he con tin -
ued what that Kravchuk be gan — strug gling for power and against a het er o ge -
neous par lia men tary elite that, de spite some ideo log i cal dif fer ences, wanted to
limit the Pres i dent’s pow ers.
Leonid Kravchuk was only tar geted by par lia men tar i ans who be longed to
the state (Kyiv) nomenklatura led by Ivan Pliushch, while Kuchma had to con -
front the “left-wing” op po si tion, which brought to gether nu mer ous op po nents
of “bour geois re forms”. The “left ist” par lia men tary elite si mul ta neously were
“coun ter- elite” out side the Verkhovna Rada. Kuchma climbed “Kyiv Olym pus”
with out hav ing any sup port ers (in clud ing army). The “left ists” dis ap proved his
pro gram for re forms while the “rightists” (the Na tional Dem o crats) boy cotted
his can di dacy at the elec tion in 1994, call ing him an “ad her ent of Mos cow”.
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 177
The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
It is also worth men tion ing that Leonid Kuchma “per son ally” con trib uted to
win ning the pres i dency in 1994. Mak ing an eval u a tion of Kuchma’s rule in gen -
eral (in clud ing his be ing the Prime Min is ter of Ukraine), we can say that he
proved him self a bad strat e gist but a bril liant tac ti cian [Vrublevs’kyi, 2005]. As
the Pres i den tial Press Sec re tary Aliona Hromnyts’ka once aptly noted, Kuchma
“per fectly” sim u lated sit u a tions. In the be gin ning of his pres i dency, Kuchma
mainly fa mil iar ised him self with the cur rent sit u a tion, which was ex tremely dif fi -
cult — ad verse eco nomic con di tions had led to the im pov er ish ment of most
Ukrai ni ans and to over whelm ing so cial ap a thy. At the same time, his team (there
were, for ex am ple, a re nowned econ o mist Anatolii Hal’chyns’kyi, the “fa ther” of
Ukrai nian hryvnia Vadym Het man and other ex pe ri enced func tion ar ies) was ac -
tively work ing on the pro ject “In de pend ent Ukraine”. Each of them was plough -
ing his field. Be sides, there was quite a strong “so cio log i cal” sup port dur ing the
pres i den tial cam paign.
The elite of Ukrai nian par lia ment were strictly against grant ing ad di tional
pow ers to the Pres i dent and sign ing the Con sti tu tional Agree ment as a “small
con sti tu tion of Ukraine”. For ex am ple, the “left ist” elite thought that those steps
would lead to the Par lia ment’s dis tanc ing from par tic i pa tion in solv ing ma jor
eco nomic and po lit i cal prob lems and thus trans form it into a merely rep re sen ta -
tive body like the State Duma in the Rus sian Fed er a tion.
Con fron ta tion be tween the Pres i dent and par lia ment con tin ued to grow. In
May 1995, still be ing trusted by most Ukrai ni ans, Kuchma of fered to con duct a
na tion wide sur vey to de fine the pub lic’s level of trust in the Pres i dent and in the
Verkhovna Rada. In fact, had the sur vey been con ducted the Par lia ment might
have been dis solved1. On 8 June, 1995, the Pres i dent and the Par lia ment2 signed
the Con sti tu tional Agree ment, which be came a “small con sti tu tion” — the law in
force. Ac cord ing to the Agree ment, the ex ec u tive branches of gov ern ment (both
cen tral and lo cal au thor i ties) were fully ac count able to the Pres i dent. Be sides, he
was en ti tled to ap point a prime min is ter with out the Par lia ment’s con sent. Thus,
the Agree ment lim ited the pow ers of the head of gov ern ment, who from then on
could not act in de pend ently.
The fight for the Con sti tu tion united the Na tional Dem o crats with cen trists
and pres i den tial team. As Leonid Kuchma rightly pointed, “... to day mak ing
Ukraine a par lia men tary re pub lic will turn into a ca tas tro phe” [Kudriachenko,
1996]. The pres ent-day events clearly dem on strate that he was not wrong.
Af ter res ig na tion of the Cab i net of Min is ters headed by Vitalii Masol and ap -
point ment of Yevhen Marchuk as a prime min is ter, the in flu ence of “left con ser -
va tors” from the for mer nomenklatura weak ened while Kuchma’s “cen trists”
gained full con trol over the ex ec u tive branch of gov ern ment. Marchuk’s Cab i net
per formed its func tions for less than a year — from June 1995 to May 1996.
During that time, Kuchma man aged to strengthen the po si tions of his “Dnip-
178 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
1 According to the results of sociological surveys conducted at that time, Ukrainians were
not satisfied with the performance of Verkhovna Rada and did not trust parliamentarians so
much.
2 The Speaker of Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Moroz was acting on behalf of the Parliament.
ropetrovian” team1: min is ters and dep uty min is ters were ap pointed by pres i den -
tial de crees. Marchuk was prac ti cally “re moved” from power, so he could not lead
“his own team” into the Cab i net of Min is ters. Be ing just a “fic ti tious” prime min -
is ter, Yevhen Marchuk started seek ing sup port from the par lia men tary elite. But
a new group led by the Head of Ukraine’s Pres i den tial Ad min is tra tion Dmytro
Tabachnyk was in ter ven ing in the pro cess of re dis tri bu tion of the “spheres of in -
flu ence”. The con flict be tween Marchuk and Tabachnyk had not been re solved in
fa vour of the then prime min is ter.
In the 1990s, Kuchma suc ceeded in solv ing the “Cri mean is sue” by push ing
aside “pro-Rus sian” elite, which had been formed in the Cri mean Pen in sula dur -
ing 1992–1994, and abol ish ing in March 1995 with the help of Cri mea’s Par lia -
ment the Cri mean pres i dency (Yurii Meshkov, who had been hold ing the of fice
of Pres i dent since Feb ru ary 1994, was the first and only Pres i dent of the Re pub lic
of Cri mea). In the sum mer of 1997, Cri mea’s par lia ment (named the Su preme
Coun cil of Cri mea) was stripped of pow ers and trans formed from a leg is la tive
into a rep re sen ta tive body.
The early months of 1995 were marked by a se ri ous con flict be tween par lia -
men tar i ans and the Head of the Pres i den tial Ad min is tra tion Dmytro Tabach -
nyk, who was not fa voured by many of them be cause of be ing too young and seem -
ing to have quite a strong in flu ence on the Pres i dent. But Tabachnyk en joyed
sup port from Kyiv’s “new” busi ness elite. It should also be men tioned that
Tabachnyk (to gether with an ex pe ri enced pol i ti cian Ivan Kuras, no ta ble an a lyst
Oleksandr Razumkov and “di rec tor” Oleksandr Volkov) had played a sig nif i cant
role in the 1994 pres i den tial cam paign. That was a very co he sive team. Be sides,
be ing af fil i ated with Kyiv “Dem o cratic Bloc”, Dmytro Tabachnyk was elected to
Kyiv City Coun cil in 1994. He be came a mem ber of the Com mu nist fac tion in the
Coun cil and ad vo cated the pres er va tion of the USSR.
As noted be fore, con fron ta tion be tween the state elite and Dmytro Ta -
bachnyk ended in fa vour of the lat ter. Tabachnyk was un likely to be un seated.
The Pres i dent’s As sis tants for Na tional Se cu rity and Mil i tary Af fairs Yurii
Havrylov and Vadym Hrechaninov were re moved from posts. A short time later,
the Pres i dent’s First As sis tant Oleksandr Razumkov faced the same fate. The
Pres i dent’s coun cil lors Dmytro Vydrin and Anatolii Hal’chyns’kyi re signed in
pro test against Tabachnyk’s “dic ta tor ship”. The or der to dis perse the Pa tri arch
of Ukrai nian Or tho dox Church of Kyiv Pa tri arch ate Volodymyr Romaniuk’s fu -
neral pro ces sion on 18 July, 1995, might also have been given by Tabachnyk.
In the sum mer of 1996, Kyiv hills were “cap tured” by “Dnipropetrovians”
(Lazarenko, Pustovoitenko, Tihipko, and Horbulin). Dmytro Tabachnyk was
the only one “stranger” to re main in Kuchma’s in ner cir cle. He was both the
founder of Kyiv team and its “hos tage”. Pavlo Lazarenko be came Ukraine’s new
prime min is ter. He ac tively pro moted his clan by trans fer ring them from pro vin -
cial towns to key po si tions in the Cab i net of Min is ters. But in Oc to ber 1996 (by
the time when Lazarenko had thor oughly “en trenched” him self in Kyiv), the
fight for power be tween the Pres i dent and Prime Min is ter broke out again. The
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 179
The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
1 It is well known that Leonid Kuchma spent most of his career at “Yuzhmash”, the Soviet
Union’s largest missile factory located in Dnipropetrovs’k.
fight got even more in tense af ter a group of the Pres i dent’s “close sup port ers” was
formed and he be gan to ex ert pres sure on the re gional elite. There were es tab -
lished po si tions of state ad min is tra tion dep uty heads for po lit i cal and le gal af -
fairs — the so-called pres i den tial “com mis sion ers”, who were sup posed to con trol
the lo cal elite. “Donets’k clan” as Kuchma’s sup port ers came into con flict with
Lazarenko’s group. Donets’k Oblast gov er nor Volodymyr Shcherban’ was
accused of in spir ing coal min ers’ strikes and re moved from of fice. “The So cial
Mar ket Choice” fac tion (Kyiv clan) headed by Marchuk was in op po si tion to
Lazarenko.
At that time, Ukraine’s oil re fin er ies were be ing re dis trib uted be tween
Kuchma, Lazarenko and Shcherban’. Peo ple close to Lazarenko tried to cap ture
Donbas by push ing aside Donets’k “lib er als”. Lazarenko had been head ing the
Cab i net of Min is ters for four months when (in Oc to ber 1996) he came into con -
flict with the Pres i dent, which re sulted in his res ig na tion in July 1997. More over,
Pavlo Lazarenko was re moved from the of fice of Prime Min is ter be cause he
seemed to be a pre tender to ab so lute power in Ukraine, as the leader of the party
“Hromada” (“The Com mu nity”). Be ing an au thor i ta tive leader and fa vour ing
those who be longed to the same re gion as him, Lazarenko an tago nised most of
new gov ern ment of fi cials and par lia men tar i ans. Dur ing 1996–1997 the Pres i -
dent in creased his own in flu ence on the re gional elite, which caused con flicts
with the Mayor of Kyiv and the Gov er nor of Kherson Oblast. There was es tab -
lished a po si tion of dep uty gov er nor for po lit i cal af fairs (in fact, a pres i den tial
“com mis sioner”) in each re gion. Par lia men tary fac tions be came the mech a nism
for in volve ment of po lit i cal par ties in “big pol i tics” and for ma tion of power struc -
tures. The role of Verkhovna Rada in re la tion ships be tween branches of gov ern -
ment, as well as its au thor ity in pub lic opin ion was grad u ally weak en ing. An other
rea son for that sit u a tion was un cer tainty of stra te gic course for de vel op ment of
parliamentarism in Ukraine.
The years 1997–1998 were also marked by “po lit i cal par ti san ship” of Uk -
raine’s po lit i cal elite. A party list elec toral sys tem prompted the elite to switch
from “non-publicness” to af fil i a tion with a cer tain po lit i cal party. Such a spon ta -
ne ous “cen tral ism” served as a way of self-pres er va tion in sit u a tion of vague ness
in pol i tics and in the sys tem of eth i cal val ues. Se nior po lit i cal cir cles be came
aware of the fact that the avail able sys tem of val ues was un der go ing a cri sis and
civil so ci ety had not been formed yet, which was dem on strated by the elec tion re -
sults in 1998.
De feat of the Na tional Dem o cratic Party (NDP) in the 1998 par lia men tary
elec tion led to ma jor per son nel changes within the re gional elite, which had not
been able to en sure good per for mance of the party. In May 1998, Leonid Kuchma
an nounced that re gional au thor i ties (first of all, lead ing cad res) would be al most
com pletely ren o vated. These changes were nec es sary for the Pres i dent to in -
crease his in flu ence on the re gional elite shortly be fore the up com ing pres i den tial
elec tion in Ukraine.
Per son nel changes in the re gional elite took place si mul ta neously with staff
re shuf fle at the Cen tre: Volodymyr Radchenko (Marchuk’s team), who had been
head ing up the Se cu rity Ser vice of Ukraine (SBU), was re placed by Leonid
Derkach. There fore, SBU’s top man age ment be gan to be re placed by new cad res.
Derkach had known Kuchma for about 25 years; they had worked to gether at
180 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
“Yuzhmash” for a long time. In the late 1990s, a “new” Ukraine ob vi ously felt the
ef fect of so-called “gen er a tion fac tor”. Clans, par ties and par lia men tary groups
formed in the years 1991–1998 had a def i nite “gen er a tional code”. From then on,
the fur ther Ukraine’s “new elite” evolved, the more no tice able “gen er a tion fac -
tor” be came, which was clearly dem on strated by par ties like the Con gress of
Ukrai nian Na tion al ists, “Re forms and Or der”, “Hromada”, “Ukraine — For -
ward!”, UNA — UNSO (“Ukrai nian Na tional As sem bly — Ukrai nian Peo ple’s
Self-De fence”), etc.
The “post-peres troika” nomenklatura is a “prod uct” of the last de cade of the
20th cen tury. The phe nom e non of po lit i cal gen er a tion (a com mu nity con sist ing
of peo ple of the same age) is char ac ter is tic of the 20th cen tury’s elite. The Sixtiers
co hort (they were born in the mid-1930s to 1940s and started their ca reers in
1960s) came to Ukrai nian pol i tics from the two com pletely dif fer ent spheres: 1)
the Com mu nist Party ap pa ra tus, 2) dis si dent, lib eral or ed u ca tional move ments.
They were too po liti cised but did not fo cus much on eco nomic prob lems. The
next group is “post-Sixtiers”, whose man a ge rial ca reers be gan in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. They con sti tute the sec ond tier of Ukrai nian pol i ti cians. The
third gen er a tion of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite came into be ing dur ing the era
of Brezhnevian stag na tion. They are for mer Komsomol (Young Com mu nist
League) func tion ar ies, who started their ca reers in the early 1980s and got am ple
op por tu ni ties for ca reer growth due to “peres troika”. The last co hort is rep re -
sented by those who were born in the 1960s — early 1970s and be gan their ca reers
at the end of “peres troika”. Their world view, val ues and goals are com pletely dif -
fer ent from the other three groups. They were mainly busi ness men. How ever, in
this group there are some rep re sen ta tives of the “po lit i cal elite” — young prag ma -
tists who nei ther have ties to the old nomenklatura nor to the Na tional Dem o -
crats, and they are “search ing” a place in pol i tics.
For Ukraine, the pe riod be tween 1991 and 1998 was marked by in tense elite
cir cu la tion and, in par tic u lar, fre quent changes of prime min is ters. For ex am ple,
Pavlo Lazarenko re mained in of fice for about 12 months. His pre de ces sors were
short-term prime min is ters too: Yevhen Marchuk headed the gov ern ment for 11
months, Vitalii Masol — for 9, Yukhym Zviahil’s’kyi — for 10, Leonid Kuchma —
for 12 months; Vitol’d Fokin was the only prime min is ter to gov ern the coun try
for nearly two years (from Oc to ber 1990 to Oc to ber 1992). Con stant gov ern -
ment re shuf fles led to per ma nent fight in po lit i cal cir cles and ir re spon si bil ity of
pol i ti cians. By 1998, the av er age turn over rate among high-rank ing gov ern ment
of fi cials had reached 46%. Vitol’d Fokin re placed 66.7% of the old cad res in the
gov ern ment with new ones, Leonid Kuchma — about 44%, Yukhym Zviahil’s’ -
kyi — 19.4%, Vitalii Masol — 53.9%, Yevhen Marchuk — 43.9%, Pavlo Lazaren -
ko — 59%, Valerii Pustovoitenko (Lazarenko’s suc ces sor) — 30.9%. Lazarenko’s
gov ern ment un der went a fun da men tal per son nel change: among those rep re -
sented the “old” team, there were only two “ter tiary” min is ters (the Min is ter of
Tim ber In dus try and the Min is ter of Emer gen cies, who worked for the gov ern -
ment dur ing 1987–1992), and Min is ter for the Cab i net of Min is ters Valerii
Pusto voi tenko, who had oc cu pied that po si tion in 1993. Marchuk’s gov ern ment
was the last to em ploy the “old” of fi cials [Shul’ha, Boiko, 1998: p. 101].
That pe riod (mid to the late 1990s) was also marked by for ma tion of the
so-called “cli en tele” around in flu en tial pol i ti cians in Rus sia (Aleksandr Rutskoi,
Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3 181
The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
Anatolii Chubais) and Ukraine (Pavlo Lazarenko, Anatolii Kinakh, etc.). The
“cli en tele” were rep re sented by con glom er ates of en ter prises, com pa nies and
groups from var i ous ar eas of the econ omy, which de rived po lit i cal and eco nomic
sup port from their “pa tron”. An other phe nom e non started tak ing place in Uk -
raine’s po lit i cal life at that time was de scribed as lobby groups vying for their in -
ter ests. Those struc tures were re lated to min is tries, man age ment boards, fi nan -
cial-in dus trial groups, stock ex changes and banks. Some groups of busi ness men
as early as 1992–1994 be gan to real ise their po lit i cal in ter ests (both ba sic and
vari able). The so-called “cor po rate think ing” started to in creas ingly pre vail in
Ukraine from 1994 on wards. “Cor po ra tions”, which brought to gether po lit i cal
and busi ness lead ers, were the core of an or gani sa tion; more over, they could be
trans formed into po lit i cal struc tures.
The “pa tron — cli ent” sys tem worked in those “cor po ra tions”, which meant
that a mem ber of the cor po ra tion in ex change for loy alty and ser vice com mit ment
gets new po lit i cal and eco nomic op por tu ni ties from a group of pa trons. Thus, the
“cli ents” be came in ter ested in rais ing their pres tige and suc ceed ing in po lit i cal
and eco nomic as pects, which pro moted the “cor po ra tion’s” de vel op ment. On the
other hand, “cor po rate think ing” con trib uted to iso la tion or rel a tive sep a ra tion
of some branches of the econ omy and to fierce com pe ti tion be tween po lit i -
cal/busi ness groups.
It was “cor po rate con science” that fa voured region ali sa tion of busi ness and
pol i tics, as well as for ma tion of clans both at the Cen tre and in re gions. Heads of
cen tral/re gional au thor i ties and per sons close to them cre ated ad min is tra tive
and busi ness clans across Ukraine, un der the aus pices of the gov ern ment and
struc tures re lated to the Cen tre, in or der to pro tect po lit i cal and eco nomic in ter -
ests of high-rank ing of fi cials.
1995–1996 were the years when both cen tral and re gional groups fin ished
form ing and then di vided be tween them selves the ma jor sources of raw ma te ri als,
prod uct mar kets and key po si tions in the gov ern ment and lo cal au thor i ties, as
well as mo nopo lised the main branches of Ukraine’s in dus try.
Those groups some what weak ened the in flu ence of sec toral ad min is tra -
tive-eco nomic groups, which pro tected in ter ests of the “di rec tor ate” in some
branches of in dus try. How ever, the ma jor in dus try clus ters re mained sta ble and
served the in ter ests of the “big league”: mil i tary-in dus trial com plex, met al lurgy,
chem i cal in dus try and ag ri cul ture.
Busi ness struc tures in volv ing for eign in vest ment made some at tempts to
cre ate their own clans, fo cus ing on the cap i tal of Rus sia or other coun tries. But
Rus sian big busi ness did not seem to have sat is fied its ap pe tites and so was un able
to start eco nomic ex pan sion. Privatisation of Ukrai nian in dus try was con trolled
in both the Cen tre and re gions, while Rus sian busi ness used the tac tics of “in flu -
ence” on Ukraine through the big-league pol i tics.
So, at that time the ma jor trend in Ukrai nian pol i tics and busi ness was char -
ac ter ised by con sol i da tion of cap i tal, party ap pa ra tus and pol i ti cians in groups
(that ac tu ally meant clans). As a re sult, they were fight ing, though “qui etly”, to
gain to tal power in the state. Both high-rank ing civil ser vants and pol i ti cians
ben e fit ted not only from le git i mate busi ness but also from “shadow” sec tor,
where “black money” cir cu lated and prof its from il le gal busi nesses were con cen -
trated and then re dis trib uted.
182 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
Be ing aimed at strength en ing con trol over the re gional elite, the cen tral
groups of po lit i cal-eco nomic elite ac tively in ter vened in gov ern ment in sti tu tions
and big busi ness. They freely in ter preted laws and reg u la tions, man ag ing at the
same time the pro cesses of re dis tri bu tion of power and privatisation. Com pet ing
groups were fo cused on dif fer ent po lit i cal fig ures, which of ten led to con flicts be -
tween branches of gov ern ment and fights be tween fac tions or par ties. Priva -
tisation of state-owned en ter prises be came a means for ex ert ing po lit i cal and eco -
nomic pres sure, or “pro tec tion ism ma chin ery”, where all rules were for sale.
The rep re sen ta tives of re gional elite con tended for in for mal im mu nity. In
fact, they were some kind of “fiefdom” or “seig niory”, where full power over re -
gions was granted in ex change for po lit i cal loy alty and elec toral sup port of their
“pa tron”. Thus, the re gional elite of ten be came a source of con flicts.
Re gional groups or, rather, clans be came the ma jor el e ment of po lit i cal and
eco nomic re la tions in Ukraine. These “clans” were usu ally headed by per sons
who worked in mu nic i pal au thor i ties, cen tral or lo cal gov ern ments [Ohorodnyk,
1996: p. 86]. In Ukraine, un like the West, cap i tal does not cre ate power; on the
con trary, power cre ates cap i tal. There fore, if the cap i tal shows dis loy alty to the
gov ern ment or re gional “clans”, it can be le gally alien ated.
Con ver sion of power com pe ten cies for privatisation into tan gi ble out comes
is one of the rea sons why power is reg u larly (usu ally once a year) re-di vided. It
(con ver sion) also con trib utes to the fact that the class of power hold ers is closed
to the pub lic and power is mo nopo lised by clans. Thus, a “new ar is toc racy” is
com ing into be ing. Region ali sa tion of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite oc curs not only
due to po lit i cal pe cu liar i ties or dif fer ences in eth nic struc ture and men tal ity, but
also to un even eco nomic de vel op ment and un equal ca pa bil i ties of the lo cal elite.
There are no po lit i cal con flicts in Ukraine, un like Rus sia, when the “cen tre”
and re gions fight against each other. There is no “Belarusian” prob lem ei ther,
when the “prov inces” fully cap ture the cen tre. The po lit i cal elite of Ukraine have
“ap pro pri ated” their re gions and man age busi ness in each of them. Now they are
try ing to com pete for po lit i cally neu tral re gions. Ac tu ally, there are two ma jor re -
gions in Ukraine: “poor” East and “rich” South, and the po lit i cally sea soned West
act ing as a “neu tral cen tre” be tween them.
The elec tion to Ukraine’s par lia ment in 1998 con trib uted to fur ther region -
ali sa tion of the so ci ety and po lit i cal cir cles. At that time, the East ern re gion had
three main cen tres with their own po lit i cal and eco nomic in ter ests: Dnipro -
petrovs’k, Donets’k, Kharkiv and sev eral mi nor (but not de pend ent on the neigh -
bours) ones — Odesa, Zaporizhia, Luhans’k. The Au ton o mous Re pub lic of Cri -
mea acted as a sep a rate unit and its in ter ests were far from those of in dus trial
East. The three above-men tioned cen tres re cruited the bulk of Ukraine’s po lit i -
cal elite, thus shar ing the “bur den” of power with Kyiv.
Dur ing the 1994 pres i den tial elec tion, the phe nom e non of “red zone” was ob -
served (ar eas vot ing for the Com mu nists and the So cial ists). That zone mainly
com prised east ern and south-east ern re gions of Ukraine. The 1998 par lia men -
tary elec tion dem on strated grow ing in flu ence of the “left ists” in the above-men -
tioned re gions and a “left ward swing” of vot ers in Ukraine as a whole. Even in
Chernivtsi Oblast sit u ated in the west of Ukraine 20.2% of the pop u la tion voted
for the Com mu nists. It should be noted that the “left ists” (es pe cially the So cial ist
Party of Ukraine) were in volved in the for ma tion of Ukraine’s par lia men tary
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
elite and com mit tees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), but ideo log i -
cally be longed to a “coun ter-elite”.
The prin ci ples of nep o tism and trib al ism had taken root among Ukraine’s po -
lit i cal elite by then. The rul ing elite were re cruited on the ba sis of kin ship or be -
long ing to the same re gion. The pres i dent pro moted his rel a tives to the top po si -
tions in po lit i cal hi er ar chy, and other of fi cials were try ing to do the same thing.
Nep o tism was a con se quence of the weak en ing of pres i den tial pow ers, when
mem ber ship in po lit i cal par ties and move ments was re placed by fam ily ties. The
lat ter even tu ally led to iso la tion of the elite. This is the most no tice able trend
among the elite in Cen tral Asia, Kazakhstan and Rus sia.
Po lit i cal sci en tists usu ally in clude in the “fam ily” not only rel a tives but also
close friends and “court iers”. For ex am ple, the Yel’tsin fam ily’s in flu ence on po -
lit i cal and so cial life in Rus sia ex ceeded all rea son able lim its. The elite were prac -
ti cally re duced to “The Fam ily”or “Fam ily Cor po ra tion”. In Ukraine, the Kuch -
ma fam ily was as so ci ated with bril liant ca reers of the Franchuks and Oleksandr
Kuz’muk, who, be ing a corps com mander be came the De fence Min is ter in one
year.
It is worth men tion ing that high-rank ing of fi cials com ing from the same re -
gion be gan to form their own groups as early as the Khrush chev era. Those groups
com peted with each other for power. The Brezhniev era (which lasted al most 20
years) can be de scribed as a reign of his own “clan” unit ing of fi cials from
Dnipropetrovs’k and Dniprodzerzhyns’k. Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast ac tu ally be -
came a “breed ing ground” for po lit i cal elite of the USSR and So viet Ukraine.
“Dnipropetrovians” en joyed sup port from Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi as the
First Sec re tary of the Com mu nist Party of Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk strove to
neu tral ise the in flu ence of “old Dnipropetrovians” be long ing to Shcherbyts'kyi’s
team. But as soon as Leonid Kuchma be came prime min is ter, a new gen er a tion of
“Dnipropetrovians” ar rived in Kyiv to fi nally reach the top of the power hi er ar -
chy in 1994.
As a team, “Dnipropetrovians” strength ened their po si tions in the years
1990–1993 (the Fokin Gov ern ment) and in 1996–1998 (gov ern ments headed
by Lazarenko and Pustovoitenko). “Odesians” were in flu en tial un der Zviahil’ -
s’kyi’s and Lazarenko’s pre mier ship while “Donets’k team” was as so ci ated with
gov ern ments headed by Kuchma, Zviahil’s’kyi and Yanukovych. The Zviahil’ -
s’kyi Gov ern ment is of ten men tioned as the gov ern ment of “Donets’k team”. On
the other hand, there was “Lviv team” rep re sented by Viktor Pynzenyk. Lviv “in -
tel lec tu als” also had their own ar eas of in flu ence. For ex am ple, “Lvivians” were
the sec ond win ner in the num ber of seats in the Kuchma Gov ern ment, as well as
un der Masol’s and Lazarenko’s pre mier ships. But they were the least in flu en tial
in the Pustovoitenko Gov ern ment. How ever, “Lvivians” were the only team
from the west of Ukraine to fo cus both on pro-Ukrai nian na tional pol icy and
“pro-West ern” eco nomic re forms.
An other phe nom e non worth con sid er ing is so cial or i gin of Ukraine’s lead ers.
Most of them (40–45%) came from peas ants, ru ral in tel li gen tsia and state of fi -
cials. Pres i dents Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, as well as prime min is ters
Pavlo Lazarenko, Yevhen Marchuk and Valerii Pustovoitenko can be in cluded in
this group. About 30% of Ukraine’s elite iden tify their par ents as ur ban in tel li -
gen tsia or white-col lar work ers. So, these peo ple have grown up in fam i lies of a
184 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
good in come and de cent so cial sta tus. A sig nif i cant part of them are de scen dants
of the So viet nomenklatura, where power had been in her ited from par ents and
grand par ents for over 70 years [Pylypenko, Pryvalov, Nikolaievs’kyi, 2008:
p. 76–77].
In fact, of fi cials of ru ral or i gin es tab lished a tra di tion of pro mot ing those who
be longed to the same re gion (city, town, oblast, etc.), thus form ing “clans” within
the gov ern ment. As pre vi ously men tioned, nearly half of Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite
were of ru ral or i gin. That might be the main rea son why the prin ci ples of trib al -
ism and nep o tism be came so eas ily in grained in them. As early as the be gin ning of
“peres troika”, some of fi cials be came en tre pre neurs and then started to cap ture
mar kets and de rive con sid er able prof its. Us ing their of fi cial po si tions, they could
do the things that were for bid den to oth ers.
Voucher privatisation changed the na ture of po lit i cal elite as the “au thors” of
privatisation. The elite be gan to split into sev eral groups of in ter ests: de part men -
tal bu reau cracy, re gional nomenklatura, di rec tor ate, pri vate en tre pre neurs, mu -
nic i pal coun cils in big cit ies, etc. They com peted with each other to take con trol
over privatisation. Some of them (for ex am ple, di rec tors of large in dus trial en ter -
prises) were in ter ested in slow ing down the privatisation pro cess.
Ukraine’s elite be gan to un dergo ma jor changes as early as 1994, when busi -
ness elite and “new Ukrai ni ans” ex pressed in ter est in pol i tics. Dur ing Kravchuk’s
pres i dency they man aged to form “lobby groups”, “cli en tele” and “pres sure
groups”, try ing to make pol i tics serve their busi ness in ter ests. In fact, all the pro -
cesses that oc curred in Ukraine’s po lit i cal life were a re flec tion of what was tak -
ing place in Rus sia at that time, where in 1993 busi ness rushed into pol i tics,
started in vest ing in par ties and par lia men tary lead ers and took an ac tive part in
par lia men tary elec tions. Both in Rus sia and in Ukraine, the “party of cap i tal” was
fi nan cially strong enough to get their hands on power. But in Ukraine, it was not
the only one. There were dif fer ent re gional busi ness clans (Donbas, Cri mea,
Dnipropetrovs’k, Odesa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Halychyna), sec toral as so ci a tions (mil i -
tary-in dus trial com plex, “agrar i ans”, “oil work ers”, etc.) and sev eral groups po lit -
i cally ori ented to wards Mos cow, Kyiv, Eu rope or cer tain po lit i cal par ties.
Pas sive par tic i pa tion of big cap i tal in pol i tics was grad u ally re placed by ac -
tive. At first, new born en tre pre neurs were busy sell ing and re sell ing state-owned
as sets or con vert ing them into pri vate prop erty. Then they started to con sol i date
their “achieve ments” and legal ise prop erty.
The 1998 par lia men tary elec tion led to the de struc tion of the pre vi ous po lit i -
cal and fi nan cial sys tem, which con sisted of prim i tive clans. Fi nan cial and po lit i -
cal groups took the first step to wards be ing civil ised: they started be ing called
par ties [Mostovaia, 1998]. But many of them were not able to com pre hend the
dif fer ence be tween par ties and firms and there fore, in stead of cre at ing a sin gle
bloc to ac com plish the goals at a re gional level, the “firm” tried to sup port “their”
party.
Ac tu ally, the pe riod of rapid de vel op ment of Ukraine’s elite (at least, its pow -
er ful start) fell on Kuchma’s reign. As it is wellknown, he was nom i nated for a
second pres i den tial term. But he started pre par ing for the elec tion ahead of time
by shuf fling the staff and build ing a con tain ment and coun ter mea sure sys tem.
The main task that Kuchma iden ti fied was to re tain power at any cost.
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
Un doubt edly, it was quite a chal leng ing task: the gap be tween the rich and
the poor kept wid en ing and thus pro voked anti-Kuchma moods. At the same
time, “left ist” par ties were gain ing strength, es pe cially the So cial ist Party led by
Oleksandr Moroz. But Kuchma’s tac ti cal tal ent came into play again; and there
was a turn ing point in that pres i den tial cam paign. He man aged to split the
“left-wing” elec tor ate due to an “eter nal op po si tion ist” Petro Symonenko, who,
us ing the res o lu tion of the CPU Con gress as a cover (how ever, he real ised that
peo ple would rather have gone to hell than vote for the “red”), ran in the elec tion
(some peo ple still be lieve that a fact of brib ery took place there). But the chance
had been lost. If all the “left-wing” forces had clus tered around Moroz, they
would prob a bly have won the pres i den tial elec tion and put an end to Kuchma’s
au thor i tar ian re gime.
The next pres i den tial elec tion, which took place in 2004, had a strong im pact
on Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite. Dur ing the elec tion cam paign, the “guar an tor”
(Leonid Kuchma) per formed multi-move com bi na tion in the elec toral field to
pro voke a clash be tween the two ri val can di dates Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor
Yanukovych, which could have led to chaos and could have posed a real threat
to Ukraine’s sov er eignty. Bal anc ing on a “ra zor’s edge”, Kuchma might have
thought that he would wait un til there was no other op tion but to call him as the
“res cuer of the na tion”. So, he might have planned to run for a third term
[Vrublevs’kyi, 2005: p. 32–33].
On the one hand, Kuchma was bluff ing when chose his “suc ces sor” (vol un -
tarily or un der pres sure of “Donets’k clan”) since he knew in ad vance that this fig -
ure would not pass. On the other hand, he dem on strated his fa vour able dis po si -
tion to wards Viktor Yushchenko in or der to earn div i dends (as a “dem o crat”) in
the West.
Po lit i cal sci en tists and so ci ol o gists have con tin u ously ana lysed those force
ma jeure events of late 2004 — early 2005, and all of them ar rived at the con clu sion
that the “Or ange Rev o lu tion” had largely de ter mined a new con fig u ra tion of
power elite.
Ow ing to Yuschenko’s vic tory in the pres i den tial elec tion of 2005, the “Or -
ange Team” en joyed an unprecedently high de gree of trust from Ukrai ni ans. But
they failed to cap i tal ise on this op por tu nity in a proper way. The pe riod im me di -
ately af ter the elec tions was marked by con tin u ous bat tles in side the “Or ange
Team”, in clud ing the fight over the of fice of prime min is ter. The Pres i dent
Viktor Yushchenko re garded Petro Poroshenko as the most ac cept able can di -
date. But hav ing bowed to pres sure of “rev o lu tion ary” masses, he had to ap point
YuliiaTymoshenko to this po si tion (who was, in her turn, the most “tal ented” ap -
pren tice of Pavlo Lazarenko). There fore, as soon as the “Or ange Team” came to
power, the pub lic wit nessed nu mer ous con flicts be tween the Pres i dent Viktor
Yushchenko and the Prime Min is ter Yuliia Tymoshenko. Once Yushchenko
man aged to win an in terim vic tory and gave the Prime Min is ter’s po si tion to
Viktor Yanukovych. How ever, a bit later Tymoshenko be came the Prime Min is -
ter again. A new round of the bat tle be tween Yushchenko and Tymoshenko
reached its peak in the win ter of 2009–2010, when the “gas is sue” came onto the
agenda.
Be ing un able to work con struc tively and co he sively, the “Or ange Team”
largely pre de ter mined Yanukovych’s vic tory at the 2010 pres i den tial elec tion.
186 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
Tymoshenko made un prec e dented ef forts to win the pres i dency but her chances
were ob vi ously slen der.
Hav ing risen to power, Yanukovych started seek ing to strengthen pres i den -
tial pow ers. All of the key po si tions in cen tral, re gional and lo cal au thor i ties were
oc cu pied by “Donets’k” clan. A strik ing ex am ple of this pol icy was the ca reer of
the Pres i dent’s el dest son Oleksandr (also known as “Den tist Sasha”), who even
had the au thor ity to con trol the Min is try of Home Af fairs. Ap pli cants for po lice
chief in each re gion had to be per son ally ap proved by him. It was im mensely ar ro -
gant and fi nan cially ag gres sive pol icy of “Donets’k clan” headed by Yanukovych
that even tu ally led to the “Rev o lu tion of Dig nity” in the win ter of 2013–2014.
Be ing un able to set tle pro tests in a peace ful way (which re sulted in Maidan Mas -
sa cre), Yanukovych was ousted from power and then es caped to Rus sia where he
was taken un der the wing of his “big brother” Vladi mir Putin. Rus sia’s an nex -
ation of Cri mea and fur ther dra matic events in Donbas were the out comes of the
anti-Ukrai nian pol icy that Yanukovych pur sued as a Kremlin pup pet.
A snap pres i den tial elec tion was held in the spring of 2014, af ter Rus sia be gan
its mil i tary ag gres sion against Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko won the vic tory in the
first round.
We de lib er ately did not make an anal y sis of po lit i cal life in Ukraine af ter the
2014 pres i den tial elec tion. First, it is too early to draw any sub stan tial (fi nal)
con clu sions about changes that have oc curred there. There is a say ing that goes,
“The big is better seen from a dis tance”. Sec ond, this pe riod should be stud ied
sep a rately in or der to make a more sub stan tial and thor ough anal y sis.
Giv ing an over all eval u a tion of be hav iour of the rul ing po lit i cal elite dur ing
the years of Ukraine’s in de pend ence, the au thors would like to draw at ten tion to
the fact that the pol i ti cians have nei ther acted ad e quately enough to meet the
chal lenges of a new his tor i cal ep och nor be haved re spon si bly enough to en sure
the fu ture of Ukraine and Ukrai ni ans. De pop u la tion, ex port of cap i tal, lack of fi -
nan cial and eco nomic as so ci a tions whose mem bers will ingly bind their per sonal
plans and the fu ture of their fam i lies to Ukraine, short-sighted de ci sion-mak ing
in the sphere of geo pol i tics (with out tak ing their long-term con se quences into
ac count), etc. clearly in di cate that there is no re spon si ble rul ing elite in Ukraine
so far. All they can do is care about the things hap pen ing “here” and “now”, and
only when they pose a threat to pol i ti cians them selves rather than to the so ci ety
on the whole or some of its sec tors [Shul’ha, 2011: p. 171].
De spite the fact that Ukraine’s po lit i cal elite ex ist, they are usu ally not open
to the pub lic. They do not de clare their fu ture plans or in ten tions openly. They do
not in form Ukrai ni ans about so cial pro jects that are go ing to be im ple mented.
They con tent them selves with mak ing gen er ous prom ises as soon as each elec tion
cam paign be gins.
One of the main in ter nal prob lems of Ukraine re lated to the for ma tion of re -
spon si ble po lit i cal elite co in cides with the global prob lem of elite’s “of fen sive”
against so cial rights of cit i zens. So, the na tional po lit i cal elite, not be ing sure of
the safety of their as sets in Ukraine, trans fer them off shore. How ever, the elite of
de vel oped coun tries are also threat en ing to move their as sets abroad if the
governments in tro duce high taxes and high so cial in sur ance con tri bu tions.
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The Political Elite of Ukraine: Historical and Sociological Analysis
Some re search ers ex plain both of these cases as the fact that the na tional elite
are mov ing to the glob al ist po si tion, chang ing their sta tus from na tional to global
and re fus ing to pro tect na tional in ter ests.
At pres ent, one of the key is sues on the agenda is the po lit i cal elite’s con sol i -
da tion. De spite the fact that this is sue has been rel e vant ever since Ukraine
gained its in de pend ence, the split in the na tional elite has never been as se ri ous as
now. All at tempts to unite the elite on the prin ci ples of com mon vi sion of his tory,
lan guage pol icy, un mask ing of the to tal i tar ian past, etc. have ended with lit tle
suc cess so far. This prob lem can be solve only if we go be yond the old par a digm
and find a new plat form for con sol i da tion of the na tional elite. Per haps it will be
pos si ble on the ba sis of over com ing cur rent prob lems and solv ing chal lenges for
the fu ture.
In this re gard, ef fec tive in ter ac tion be tween pol i tics and busi ness, abil ity of
Ukrai nian busi ness men to act ef fec tively within the cur rent po lit i cal con junc -
ture as sume great im por tance.
Politicisation of busi ness in Ukraine oc curs in the con text of the so ci ety’s
politicisation. But en tre pre neurs or gan ise their so cial and eco nomic in ter ests
faster than other so cial strata. Try ing to in flu ence pol i tics, big busi ness not only
uses con ven tional forms of po lit i cal ac tion but also re sorts to lob by ing pol i ti -
cians. In fact, busi ness cir cles pos sess con sid er able po ten tial for po lit i cal ac tiv ity,
which can be used in crit i cal sit u a tions.
The main task of busi ness is to cre ate an in de pend ent eco nomic space. En tre -
pre neurs will be able to be come ad e quate so cial ac tors only if the civil so ci ety is
built, where econ omy and pol i tics ex ist as au ton o mous spheres of life and there is
a mech a nism en sur ing rep re sen ta tion of dif fer ent so cial in ter ests at po lit i cal
level.
In to day’s Ukraine, new born en tre pre neurs seem to feel solid ground and ac cu -
mu late re sources, turn ing into a real so cial and po lit i cal force. En tre pre neur ship as
a phe nom e non emerges in a spe cific po lit i cal, eco nomic and so cial en vi ron ment.
On the other hand, so cial, po lit i cal and eco nomic con junc ture though does not di -
rectly in flu ence var i ous so cial move ments can stim u late or in hibit them.
At pres ent, the old state is prac ti cally de stroyed and a new one needs to be
built. Val ues vac uum is ex ist ing in par al lel with power vac uum. Po lit i cal in sta bil -
ity, un cer tain leg is la tion in her ited from the pre vi ous to tal i tar ian re gime, re lent -
less con flict be tween the leg is la tive and ex ec u tive branches (along with weak
and cor rupt ju di cial sys tem) are fac tors con trib ut ing to un fa vour able po lit i cal
en vi ron ment for de vel op ment of na tional busi ness in Ukraine.
Ukrai ni ans’ dis trust in gov ern ment is so strong that any gov ern ment pol icy
or ini tia tive is met with in creas ing scep ti cism. The econ omy is still laden with
state mo nop o lies. Cor rup tion, ma fia, un fair tax sys tem and high in fla tion rates
make even the most suc cess ful en tre pre neurs feel pes si mis tic. They have to strug -
gle to sur vive in stead of be ing fo cused on their own de vel op ment. There fore,
Ukrai nian busi ness men are sig nif i cantly in volved in pol i tics.
There is no point in try ing to find com mon po lit i cal in ter ests among Ukrai -
nian en tre pre neurs. On the con trary, they are be ing di vided into a num ber of
groups hav ing dif fer ent po lit i cal ori en ta tions, dif fer ent de grees of in ter ac tion
with po lit i cal or gani sa tions and in sti tu tions, dif fer ent forms and meth ods of po -
lit i cal pres sure.
188 Со ци о ло гия: те о рия, ме то ды, мар ке тинг, 2016, 3
Valerii Pylypenko, Yurii Pryvalov
The 2004 pres i den tial elec tion led to sig nif i cant changes in the con fig u ra tion
of busi ness groups, sta tus of dif fer ent oli gar chic groups in the so ci ety and de gree
to which the prop erty was se cured by state. Thus, Ukraine’s eco nomic elite had to
in ten sify their po lit i cal ac tiv i ties. Al most all of the eco nomic elite’s mem bers
took part in fund ing the par lia men tary elec tion cam paign in 2006, pro vid ing fi -
nan cial sup port to cer tain po lit i cal par ties. Be cause of pro por tional rep re sen ta -
tion, big busi ness own ers could not stand as can di dates in the elec tion di rectly.
There were po lit i cal par ties be tween cap i tal and vot ers. The oligarchs (pow er ful
busi ness men) who had not taken care to cre ate their own par ties be fore the cam -
paign had to col lab o rate with other par ties in the par lia ment [Shul’ha, 2006:
p. 29–30].
Study ing po lit i cal ac tiv i ties that Ukrai nian en tre pre neurs are in volved in, a
re searcher should pay spe cial at ten tion to the two fol low ing con flicts which can
be re solved through po lit i cal means. The first one is a con flict be tween the ex ec u -
tive branch and en tre pre neurs and it is re lated to the im ple men ta tion of eco -
nomic re forms in pub lic sec tor (privatisation, cor pora ti sa tion), as well as tough
anti-in fla tion ary and anti-cri sis mea sures. It is dif fi cult to as sess how se ri ously
and deeply this con flict af fected the in ter ests of en tre pre neurs and pre dict what
ac tions they will take in the fu ture. The sec ond con flict is re lated to grow ing con -
tra dic tions both within the stra tum of en tre pre neurs and be tween the na tional
and for eign cap i tal. Some en tre pre neurs seek to equa lise while the oth ers want to
choose ini tial con di tions that ex ist at the be gin ning of real eco nomic re forms.
There fore, it is im por tant to in ves ti gate into causes of the con flict, try to as sess
how se ri ous this con flict is and whether it is pos si ble to reach con sen sus within
the corps of Ukrai nian en tre pre neurs by po lit i cal methods.
Fi nally, it is es sen tial to make short-term fore casts con cern ing po lit i cal ac -
tiv i ties pre ferred by dif fer ent groups of en tre pre neurs and de velop rec om men da -
tions aimed at rais ing the ef fi ciency of re verse im pact of gov ern ment au thor i ties
on busi ness. The feed back is nec es sary for con sol i da tion of so cial ba sis and search
of po lit i cally rea son able com pro mise that will fa cil i tate prog ress in im ple ment ing
eco nomic re forms and thus en sure the pro cess of mod erni sa tion.
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