The Development of Cross-Straits Relations
Збережено в:
| Дата: | 2011 |
|---|---|
| Автор: | |
| Формат: | Стаття |
| Мова: | English |
| Опубліковано: |
Інститут сходознавства ім. А.Ю. Кримського НАН України
2011
|
| Назва видання: | Китаєзнавчі дослідження |
| Теми: | |
| Онлайн доступ: | http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/31209 |
| Теги: |
Додати тег
Немає тегів, Будьте першим, хто поставить тег для цього запису!
|
| Назва журналу: | Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine |
| Цитувати: | The Development of Cross-Straits Relations / Ying-Ming Lee // Китаєзнавчі дослідження: Зб. наук. пр. — 2011. — Т. 1. — С. 68-77. — Бібліогр.: 5 назв. — англ. |
Репозитарії
Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine| id |
irk-123456789-31209 |
|---|---|
| record_format |
dspace |
| spelling |
irk-123456789-312092012-02-27T12:14:51Z The Development of Cross-Straits Relations Lee, Ying-Ming Політичний та соціально-економічний розвиток Китаю 2011 Article The Development of Cross-Straits Relations / Ying-Ming Lee // Китаєзнавчі дослідження: Зб. наук. пр. — 2011. — Т. 1. — С. 68-77. — Бібліогр.: 5 назв. — англ. XXXX-0094 http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/31209 en Китаєзнавчі дослідження Інститут сходознавства ім. А.Ю. Кримського НАН України |
| institution |
Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine |
| collection |
DSpace DC |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Політичний та соціально-економічний розвиток Китаю Політичний та соціально-економічний розвиток Китаю |
| spellingShingle |
Політичний та соціально-економічний розвиток Китаю Політичний та соціально-економічний розвиток Китаю Lee, Ying-Ming The Development of Cross-Straits Relations Китаєзнавчі дослідження |
| format |
Article |
| author |
Lee, Ying-Ming |
| author_facet |
Lee, Ying-Ming |
| author_sort |
Lee, Ying-Ming |
| title |
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations |
| title_short |
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations |
| title_full |
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations |
| title_fullStr |
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations |
| title_sort |
development of cross-straits relations |
| publisher |
Інститут сходознавства ім. А.Ю. Кримського НАН України |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| topic_facet |
Політичний та соціально-економічний розвиток Китаю |
| url |
http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/31209 |
| citation_txt |
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations / Ying-Ming Lee // Китаєзнавчі дослідження: Зб. наук. пр. — 2011. — Т. 1. — С. 68-77. — Бібліогр.: 5 назв. — англ. |
| series |
Китаєзнавчі дослідження |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT leeyingming thedevelopmentofcrossstraitsrelations AT leeyingming developmentofcrossstraitsrelations |
| first_indexed |
2025-07-03T11:37:55Z |
| last_indexed |
2025-07-03T11:37:55Z |
| _version_ |
1836625613233848320 |
| fulltext |
68
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations
Ying-Ming Lee
Foreword
As a consequence of an unresolved historical conflict, the body of waters between
Taiwan and Mainland China had, before the ‘70’s, become an unbridgeable political
chasm that divided the two sides. Even though efforts in recent years have brought
about favorable interactions in many areas, a number of issues remain thorny and
difficult, creating mistrust and misunderstanding. Differences over these issues have
not only created mutual distrust and misunderstanding, they have also cast a shadow
over the future of cross-strait relations.
In what ways have cross-strait relations evolved? What is the status quo? What are
the crucial issues that stall progress? How do the two governments concerned view
each other? And how do they respond to actions taken by the other? These are the fo-
cal issues we must address. We will explore into these issues and, furthermore, ponder
over how the relationship should develop.
I. Developments in cross-Straits relations
A. Divided governance: history and reality
The Nationalist-Communist Civil War has resulted in the existence of two separate
and mutually non-subordinate governments on Mainland China and Taiwan. Divided
governance has persisted to this day, and no solution is yet in sight. The development
of cross-Straits relations can be roughly divided into three stages:
(1) Military confrontations (1949-1978)
During this period the two sides stood in tense confrontation. Our government
held the conviction that “The Hans and their enemies do not co-exist” and endeavored
to recover the lost Mainland. On the other hand, the PRC aimed to “liberate Taiwan
through the use of force.” Major battles such as the Guningtou Battle (1949) and the
August 23rd Artillery Battle (1958) took place during this period. It was not until the
1960’s did one see any significant sign of reduced military hostilities between the two
sides. Complete cessation of military confrontation came only after the PRC and the
United States established diplomatic ties in 1979.
(2) Peaceful face-off (1978-1987)
Due to changes on the international scenes, cross-Straits relations moved away
from military confrontations to peaceful face-off. After the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations with the United States in 1979, the PRC advocated, in its “Letter
to the Taiwan Compatriots,” an agenda of “peaceful reunification” and proposed
that the two sides establish “Three Direct Links” in commerce, postal services and
transportation. A few years later, Deng Xiaoping brought forth in 1984 the policy
of “one nation, two systems,” intending it to serve as the basis for resolving the
cross-Straits question. Our government responded with “Reunification under the
Three Principles of the People” and adopted the policy of the “Three No’s,” name-
ly, “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise,” as a counter measure against
the PRC’s reunification offensive.
69
(3) Civilian exchanges (1987 up to the present)
In 1987 the government lifted the martial law and allowed citizens to visit relatives
on the Mainland, thus opening up a new era in cross-Straits relations. After the ‘90s, the
two sides further set into action multilevel interactions and exchanges, and continued
to move toward establishing a deeper relationship of cooperation. Although political
issues are still as difficult as ever to resolve, the two shores have continued to carry out
frequent exchanges in areas such as trade and commerce, social activities, culture and
education, academic cooperation and entertainment and recreation.
B. Key problems in present cross-Straits relations
After 50 long years of separation and divided governance, significant political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural differences have developed between the two sides. In terms
of land mass, population, natural resources and military strength, the two sides are
obviously two mismatched political entities. With marked differences in lifestyle and
huge imbalance of power, it is inevitable that, in the process of exchange and interac-
tion, discrepancies of perceptions will develop and controversies will arise. Differences
in regard to the issue of sovereignty are especially poignant.
(1) Differences over “One China”
The greatest controversy revolves around the issue of “one China.” Basically, the
PRC regards “one China” as a description of the status quo, and takes the principle of
“one China” as the prerequisite for any contact and negotiation of the two sides. They
are unequivocally opposed to “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” as well as
views such as “divided state” or “two equal political entities.” The PRC emphasizes
that “anything can be discussed under the principle of one China,” hoping to push
Taiwan into the “one China” framework the moment it agrees to negotiate. Our gov-
ernment, on the contrary, insists that at the present stage Taiwan is a sovereign state
called the Republic of China, its future to be decided only by the people of Taiwan.
This clearly contradicts the PRC position that “Taiwan is a part of China, and the
People’s Republic of China is the only China.” Obviously, the greatest dilemma that
bedevils cross-straits relations at present is the discrepancy in the perception of the
principle of “one China.”
(2) Different goals for interaction
As an extension of the controversies discussed above, the two shores also differ in
their demands for the mode of interaction. Whereas Taiwan seeks to alleviate the tense
political relations and increase Taiwan’s economic interests through bilateral economic
and trade interactions, the PRC hopes to use the same channel to force Taiwan back
to the “one China” framework. For this reason, our government is concerned about
the disadvantages Taiwan may suffer from unchecked bilateral trade and economic
exchanges. Thus our government, while encouraging bilateral trade relations, seeks
at the same time to dampen relocation of Taiwanese industry to mainland China, and
vigorously promotes investment in other countries.
(3) Differences in the characterization of cross-Straits relations
Finally, the two sides characterize the nature of cross-Straits relations in radically
different light. Taiwan has indefatigably emphasized democratization in an effort to
merge into the international mainstream, hoping to obtain recognition and support of
the international community, thereby by turning the cross-Straits question into an in-
ternational issue so as to fend off Chinese hostility. The PRC, on the other hand, sees
the cross-Straits question as a “domestic issue” under the “one China” framework. The
PRC therefore tries its best to block and contain Taiwan’s international space, turning
cross-Straits diplomatic contest into a zero sum game.
70
II. Mainland’s Taiwan Policy
A. Guiding principles of China’s cross-Straits policy
From its founding in 1949 to the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the
United States in 1979, the PRC consistently regarded cross-Strait relations from the
perspective of “dynastic change.” It insisted that it had inherited the sovereignty of the
Republic of China, and saw the Republic of China on Taiwan as a renegade regime that
refused to come under its rule.
(1) One China principle
As a result, China’s position remains unchanged throughout the vicissitudes of history:
from the early “liberation by force” to the present “peaceful reunification,” China, though
adjusting its form of approach, has never, in spirit, swerved from the principle of “one
China.” In other words, though with the change of time and environment China may have
rephrased its justification, yet under the banners of “national sovereignty” and “national
reunification,” it remains adamant on the principle of “one China.”
(2) Non-equal political entities
Governed by the principles broached above, the PRC does not allow Taiwan to
develop substantial political ties with other countries, and takes strong measures to
suppress Taiwan’s diplomatic space. The PRC, however, realizes that it is unable to
completely block off Taiwan’s international space. Thus while the PRC insists that the
international community can only treat Taiwan as a non-equal political entity and not as
an independent political entity, it does allow Taiwan to move in the ambiguous space
where economic issues are addressed among sovereign states. The fact that both PRC
and Taiwan joined WTO simultaneously is one prominent example which indicates that
Taiwan is allowed to participate in international activities by using names which vaguely
suggest that it is not “China’s Taiwan,” thereby carrying implications of sovereignty.
In short, any event which involves national sovereignty and carries a political
implication which impinges on the principle of “One China” is bound to incur the ire
of the PRC and provoke it to exert its utmost to suppress Taiwan’s international space.
The PRC holds the position that it has inherited China’s sovereignty, that Taiwan is
an inalienable part of China and therefore does not enjoy any sovereignty. From this
position the PRC has never retreated.
B. “One Country Two Systems” and other Taiwan policies
Governed by the principles broached above, the PRC has never given up the pos-
sibility of liberating Taiwan by force, even though no military conflict has occurred
since 1979. Upholding the premise of “not giving up the option of liberating Taiwan by
force,” the PRC has nevertheless adopted a flexible approach and proposed to Taiwan
a variety of ways to solve the issue divided governance. In the paragraphs below, we
shall examine the issue from the PRC’s perspective.
(1) “Letter to Taiwan Compatriots” and “Ye Jianying’s Nine-point Proposal”
“Letter to Taiwan Compatriots,” announced at the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress in 1979, is generally taken to have marked the
beginning of PRC’s adjustments of its attitude and policy toward Taiwan. The
Letter recognizes that Taiwan is an economic entity, and seems to carry a vague
and indirect implication that Taiwan is a political entity. Moreover, the 1981 “Ye
Jianying’s Nine-point Proposal” officially positions Taiwan as a special adminis-
trative region. This is as good as saying that the civil war between the two shores
has ended, the change of regimes completed, the PRC has inherited China’s sover-
eignty and Taiwan is but a local special administrative region under its rule.
71
(2) The Proposal of “one Country, two systems”
The basic principle of “one nation, two systems” is that “there are two different
political systems within the same country.” The concept of “special administrative re-
gion” as broached in “Ye Jianying’s Nine-point Proposal ” becomes the foundation
of the PRC’s “one nation, two systems” position, and in the 1994 “Sino-British Joint
Declaration” this is precisely the model according which the Hong Kong question was
dealt with. The PRC further declared, immediately following this, that it would solve
the Taiwan issue in accordance with the model of “one nation, two systems.” Since
1990, especially in its 1993 white book The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of
China, the PRC has directly treated the Taiwan Question as if the two shores had al-
ready been in the state of “one nation, two systems.” In such a situation, the PRC would
of course continue to oppose Taiwan contending with it for legitimacy, or taking such
position as the divided state or two equal political entities to wrestle with it. Proceeding
from such a position, the PRC is opposed to Taiwan maintaining any external gov-
ernmental relations while allowing non-governmental ones. What we have discussed
earlier, that Taiwan may join the international community without highlighting its sov-
ereign status, is a case in point. Nevertheless, the PRC understands that it cannot force
Taiwan into this constricted framework with complete success.
(3) Jiang Zemin’s eight-point formula
In 1995, Jiang Zemin came up with an eight-point proposal on the Taiwan question,
commonly referred to as “Jiang Zemin’s eight-point formula.” Some interpret it as ex-
pressing a certain degree of goodwill, but others see in it an attempt to pacify Taiwan.
In any case, Jiang Zemin’s “eight-point formula” does catch one’s attention: it not only
abstains from any mention of “one nation, two systems,” but also goes on to emphasize
that both sides can use shared Chinese culture as a platform for a cultural rather than
economic integration. Besides, it also proposes that leaders of both shores undertake re-
ciprocal visits, and that the state of belligerency be brought to an end through negotia-
tions under the principle of “one China.” Jiang’s eight point proposal has subsequently
become the pivot in the PRC’s dealings with Taiwan.
(4) Hu Jintao’s four-point proposal and the anti-secession law
In March 2005, PRC president Hu Jintao enunciated a four-point platform on cross-
Straits relations. The four points include: never waver in adhering to the one-China
principle, never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification, never deviate from the
guiding principle of placing hope on the people of Taiwan, and never compromise in
opposing Taiwanese secessionist activities. This is generally regarded as Hu’s pro-
pagandist carrot-and-stick approach and a declaration of sovereignty over Taiwan,
but once again it also opens China’s hard-line position to questioning and criticism.
Besides, passage of the Anti-Secession Law on March 14 leads many to think that
cross-Straits relations have reached a new turning point.
III. Taiwan’s Mainland policy
A. Principles guiding Taiwan’s handling of cross-Strait relations
(1) The principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity
After the lifting of martial law, although our cross-Strait policy has undergone
changes in the different historical-political milieu, the guiding principles remain the
same. The supreme principles which guide our handling of cross-Strait relations have
always been “reason, peace, parity and reciprocity.” Reason defines the basic thinking
in our government’s handling of cross-Strait affairs; peace is the fundamental principle;
72
parity means that people on Taiwan and on the Mainland should be treated with equal
respect; and reciprocity aims to achieve a win-win situation by taking care of both
sides’ interest in cross-Strait exchange. On the basis of the these four principles, our
government holds respecting the free choice of the 23 million people on Taiwan and
insuring their future well-being as highest guidelines in handing cross-Strait matters.
(2) The three no’s
During the period of military confrontation, our government’s mainland policy, pro-
ceeding from the preoccupation with “contending for political legitimacy” with the
PRC, can be summed up as “opposing Communism and recovering the Mainland,”
with “No coexistence with the enemy of Han” as a complementary principle. During
the time of peaceful face-off, in order to contend with the PRC’s united front offensive,
our government adopted the “Three No’s” policy as a guiding principle in dealing with
cross-Strait affairs.
(3) Two equal political entities
In 1987 our government allowed its citizens to visit their relatives on the Chinese
mainland, thus officially ushered in an era of legal civilian contacts and exchanges
between the two shores, and changes in cross-Strait relations began to develop. On
top of this, the death of President Chiang Ching-guo in 1988, when the cold war era
coming to an end, brought about a reshuffle in Taiwan’s political power structure, and
the government’s Mainland policy switched from the “Three No’s” mentioned above to
that of “two equal political entities,” which may also be regarded as the “quasi-divided
nation model.” With the adoption of the so-called “pragmatic foreign policy” as the
new mode of thinking in diplomatic affairs and Mainland policies, the government
began, in the 90’s, to lay down a new foundation for the handling of cross-Strait
relations. In this context, a batch of new organizations were created: The National
Reunification Council, The Mainland Affairs Council of The Executive Yuan, and The
Straits Exchange Foundation. These organizations were to play an important role in the
institution and implementation of cross-Strait policies.
(4) Guidelines for national reunification
In 1991, “The Guidelines for National Reunification” was promulgated and “The
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion” was termi-
nated. This means that the government has declared, de jure, the end of the Nationalist-
Communist Civil War and no longer views the PRC as a rebel group. In 1993, “Statutes
Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland
Area,” which regulates the dealings between people of the two sides, was enacted.
The actions taken by the government signals that cross-Strait relations are headed in
a promising direction. This also indicates that the government is determined to dispel
the shadows of the Civil War and reestablish a normalized and regulated cross-Strait
relationship that conforms to the need of the times. From our perspective, cross-Strait
relations have gradually entered the stage of normal development since the ‘90s.
Even though there have been moments of tension in the decade since the beginning
of cross-Strait exchange, and even though with the first party alternation in power in
2000 some policy adjustments have been made, the principles of reason, peace, parity,
and reciprocity remain the core values that tie the policies together.
B. Guidelines for national reunification and other Mainland policies
Enacted in 1991, the “Guidelines for National Unification” can be seen as the high-
est guiding principle of our country’s Mainland policy in the 90’s. It is also an expres-
sion of our goodwill toward and high expectation of Mainland China. Important prin-
ciples of the “Guidelines” are as follows:
73
(1) Establishing a democratic, free and equitably prosperous China
The goal of “The Guidelines” is to establish a “democratic, free, and equitably
prosperous China.” It holds fast to the position of “one China” and emphasizes that
divided governance of the two sides is a temporary and transitional phenomenon, and
that China will inevitably move forward toward reunification. It emphatically stresses
the undeniable fact of the Republic of China’s existence. It seeks to safeguard Taiwan’s
security and well-being, and to open up dialogue and negotiation with the other side in
accordance with the principles of reason, peace, parity and reciprocity. The Guidelines
also draws up a time frame for reunification to take place in three phases:
Chart 7-1 The three phases for unification in the National Reunification Guidelines
Short Term exchanges and reciprocity
Neither side denies the other’s existence
as a political entity, and neither side
disrupts the other’s activities in the
international community
Middle Term mutual trust and cooperation
Creating official communication
channels, promoting mutual visits by
high-ranking officials, and realizing the
three direct links
Long Term consultation for reunification
Setting up consultation mechanisms
to handle the task of reunification in
accordance with the will of the people
The drawing up and implementation of the Guidelines represented our government’s
policy in the early phase of cross-Strait contacts; it continued to cast cross-Strait rela-
tions in the light of the Nationalist-Communist civil war and still entertained the pos-
sibility of eventual reunification. However, changes in domestic politics have so radical-
ized our relationship with the PRC that it has become ever clearer that we are moving
toward positioning the two sides as two separate and independent political entities. Thus
on February 27, 2006 our government declared that the Guidelines were no longer ap-
plicable. Nevertheless, things such as establishing communication channels and fulfilling
the three direct links remain important principles in our current cross-Strait policy.
(2) Two equal political entities
In contrast to the Guidelines, at the present stage, our country’s Mainland policy
moves toward the position that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state. In October
1998, for example, when Mr. Gu Zhenfu led a delegation to Shanghai and Beijing, our
government explicitly cast the visit in the light of “two equal political entities,” a posi-
tion which guided the the delegation’s discussions and interactions with the PRC. The
position was reiterated in President Li Tenghui’s July 1999 proposition that the two po-
litical entities across the Taiwan Strait constitute a “special state to state relationship.”
After the change of administration in 2000, President Chen Shuibian’s pronouncements
on cross-Strait relations or Mainland policy also revolved around this axis.
IV. Cross-Strait interactions and their prospect
A. Respective political, social, and economic transformations on each side of
the Taiwan Strait
(1) Taiwan
Since its retreat to Taiwan in 1949, our government has moved forward in great
strides toward building Taiwan into a modern nation. After decades of hard work, the
goal has finally been achieved: Taiwan is now a prosperous treasure island.
74
(a) The realization of democracy
Politically, our country has steadily moved towards democratization. After the con-
clusion of the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion
in 1991, our country launched forth a series of constitutional reforms, including the
broadening of people’s rights to political participation and the full-scale re-election
of members of the legislature. The institution of direct presidential election in 1996 is
a special signal of the achievement of Taiwan’s democratic transformation. And the
party alternation in power that took place in 2000 is a still more significant milestone,
which marks the consolidation of our country’s democratization.
(b) An economic miracle
Economically, the government has, since the ‘50’s, launched a series of reforms
in an effort to rejuvenate rural economy, and thus lay down a solid foundation for
Taiwan’s economic revival. In addition, subsequent economic planning and efficient
use U.S. aids led to Taiwan’s rapid economic development, culminating in the creation
of the much-envied “economic miracle” in the ‘80’s. Thus in thirty short years, Taiwan
moved from an underdeveloped economy to a developing economy, and is forging in
great strides toward the status of a developed country.
(c) A pluralistic society
Political and economic achievements energized Taiwan and all sorts of social groups
and activities emerge with unusual vigor and vitality. Ideas of freedom and democracy
are deeply rooted in the society; people on Taiwan are not only encouraged to speak out
their minds and express their opinions, but to turn them into reality. A myriad voices
and activities are heard and seen in every corner of the society, forming into a grand
symphony that further invigorates Taiwan, filling it with life and vitality, fully reveal-
ing it to be a free, democratic and pluralistic society.
(2) Mainland China
(a) The making of a world factory
Mainland China, on the other hand, has suffered from the disasters of “The Three Red
Flags” and “The Great Cultural Revolution” after the founding of the PRC, and lagged
behind Taiwan politically and economically in the comparable period. It was not until
1978 when Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of “Reform and Opening-up” did Mainland
China’s economy begin to show sign of life. As the reform kicked off, Mainland China
sought actively to merge into the system of operation of the world capital, aiming, as the
primary goal at the heart of its national policy, for a general improvement of its economy.
On the one hand, it endeavored to build a strong economy by first developing pilot “spots”
and the coastal provinces, hoping that the effects of reform would spread to other regions.
On the other, it stepped up economic and commercial cooperation with the world commu-
nity, offering outstanding investment terms to attract foreign capital. This not only made
possible Mainland China’s rapid economic growth, but also greatly facilitated the continu-
ing inflow of foreign capital and skills, turning Mainland China into a “world factory.”
(b) The continuation of authoritarianism
Although the PRC has achieved phenomenal success economically, politically it
continues to tread down the path of authoritarianism, and its people enjoy rather limited
freedom.
(c) The corruption of social institutions
In the absence of complementary measures, the negative aspects of lopsided eco-
nomic development have begun to surface. As the single-minded pursuit of economic
growth failed to foster a spirit of respect for the rules and regulations of the system,
many high-ranking officials were often able to feather their own nests in the process
75
of government-industry interactions, resulting in wide spread corruption. Besides,
overemphasizing development of the industrial sector to the neglect of agricultural
construction has given rise to such problems as “the three agricultures.” All these are
urgent issues that demand to be addressed.
B. The factor of international politics
Taiwan and Mainland China are both members of the interactive global system.
Hence, any development in their relationship will affect not only themselves, but also
the world community. By the same token, changes on the international scene are bound
also to affect cross-Strait relations.
(1) Attitude and role of the United States
In the international society today, the United States is undoubtedly the one nation
that wields the greatest influence on cross-Straits relations. Both sides covet the support
of the United States so that it may have a stronger hand in dealing with the other side.
Similarly, US intervention in cross-Strait politics also proceeds from consideration self-
interest. Thus while during the Cold War period, the US regarded Taiwan as an important
strategic bastion in its struggle against communism and Russia, later it chose, also out of
strategic consideration, to cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in order to normalize rela-
tions with the PRC. After the disintegration of the USSR, the US views the PRC as great-
est threat to its hegemonic status, and their relationship becomes rather subtle. For the
US, a stable cross-Strait relation is in its best interest, because once any disturbances arise
between the two sides, the US will inevitably be drawn into the conflict and its national
interests jeopardized. The US certainly does not want to relive the nightmare of another
Vietnam War. Moreover, the US is deeply wary of China’s “peaceful rise” and wants to
avoid an open confrontation with China. Thus the US chooses to play the role of peace-
keeper in the Taiwan Strait, trying to prevent either side from taking any provocative or
aggressive act. Indeed, any exploration into the issue of cross-Strait relations is bound to
go amiss if it fails to take into consideration the role of the US.
(2) The concern of neighboring countries
Seen from the perspective of regional politics, since both sides are located within
East Asia, any cross-Strait confrontation or collaboration is bound to have an impact
on the security and development of the entire region. Any warfare between the two
sides will inevitably affect the future of all East Asian countries. For this reason, de-
velopments in cross-Strait relations are a matter of great concern to the neighboring
countries. For example, when the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
was renewed in 1996, it was expanded to include the Taiwan Strait as an area of their
security concern. Though this drew strong protest from the PRC, it nevertheless dem-
onstrates that developments in cross-Strait relations will affect the international com-
munity in a way that cannot be ignored.
C. The present situation of cross-Strait exchanges and their future prospect
In October 1987, the PRC drew up six regulations to govern Taiwan compatriots’
entry into and exit from Mainland China. In November of the same year, our govern-
ment opened up Mainland-bound family visits. These can be seen as a new milestone in
cross-Strait exchanges and economic-trade interactions. In the ‘90s, cross-Strait relations
achieved a significant degree of breakthrough. In 1991 our government founded The
Straits Exchange Foundation, and in the following year the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits was created by the PRC. In 1994 these two organizations spon-
sored the “Gu-Wang meeting” in Singapore. The meeting, conducted through a non-offi-
cial mechanism, was the first cross-Strait political contact and negotiation, and it brought
about a period of amicable interactions in cross-Strait relationship.
76
However, after the mid-‘90s differences and disagreements over a number of is-
sues have eroded mutual trust and blocked effective communication. For example, the
PRC’s military maneuvers in the Strait in 1996 led to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis,
which poignantly reminded Taiwan oft China’s military threat. In 2000, after party
alternation took place in Taiwan, the PRC has repeatedly engineered our allies’ termi-
nation of diplomatic relations with us. In the “Anti-Secession Law” of 2005, the PRC
reiterated the position that it would not give up the option of liberating Taiwan by force.
Added to this the longtime disagreement over the issue of sovereignty, and you have a
very real element of uncertainty and instability in cross-Strait relations.
Although factors of instability have brought political contact and exchange to a
standstill, on the non-official level, especially in trade and business, which have grown
to be mutually interdependent for people across the Strait, exchanges and cooperation
have spread like brush fires. Because of this, cross-Strait relations take on the character
of “politically cold, economically hot.” Our government, seeing that cross-Strait trade
and economic development needs to be promoted, has endeavored to adopt a number
of effective measures. For example, regulations which govern the economic activities
of Taiwanese businessmen on Mainland China have changed with the shift of policy
from “go slow, be patient” to “positive management and effective liberalization,” thus
further strengthening economic and commercial ties across the Strait.
In regard to the “Three Direct Links,” there has been substantial progress after
the party alternation. On January 1st, 2001, our government further made the ports of
Jinmen-Xiaman and Mazu-Fuzhou as sites of the “Mini Three Direct Links.” This not
only enhanced economic and commercial exchanges of the two sides, but could also be
seen as a harbinger of the “Three Direct Links” proper. The “New Year Charter Flight,”
initiated in 2003, can be seen as the forerunner of direct transportation, boding well for
its future development. Besides, the first cargo charter flight took place in July 2006
and opened up another opportunity for the Three Direct Links. All these show that trade
and economic activities between the two sides continue to move in a positive direction.
Beside trade and economy, other types of exchanges across the Strait have also
been going on and progressing steadily. It is commonplace for people from Taiwan to
visit the Chinese mainland as tourists. Academics, educators as well as people from
the cultural circles from both sides have frequently organized conferences and invited
members from each side to participate. The film and TV industry from both sides have
also worked together to produce works that are widely circulated across the Strait. One
must mention in particular that, in recent years, Taiwanese drama has enjoyed a phe-
nomenal success among Mainland audiences. Even religious groups from Taiwan have
caught on and organized massive pilgrimage to China. All these signal that the lives
of the people from both sides of the Strait have already been closely knitted together,
forming a symbiotic, co-prosperity sphere.
Today, there still exist significant uncertainties in cross-Strait relations. Although
cross-Strait relations once fell to a freezing point after the passage of the Anti-Secession
Law in 2005, but what with the timely visits to Mainland China by KMT chairman Lian
Zhan and PFP chairman James Soong, their meetings with PRC president Hu Jintao,
Mainland China’s good will as conveyed through the promise to send Taiwan a pair of
pandas as gift, and tariff exemption for imported fruits from Taiwan, a wide space in the
future prospect of cross-Strait relationship is opened for one’s imagination. It is hoped
that people from both sides of the Strait would apply greater wisdom and work closely
together to break the deadlock that has troubled the two sides for so long. Abiding by the
principle of parity, respect, and reciprocity, let’s move, through more interactions and
exchanges, toward a bright and happy future for people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
77
Footnotes:
1. Ma Ying-jeou, “Liangan guanxi de huigu yu qianzhan” (Cross-Strait Relations:
Review and Prospect”), in Huang Tianzhong and Zhang Wuyue, eds., Liangan
guanxi yu dalu zhengche (Cross-Strait Relations and Mainland Policy) (Taipei:
Wunan, 1993), 25-7.
2. Ling Yingming and Zhang Yazhong, Zhongguo dalu yu liangan guanxi
(Mainland China and Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Shengzhi, 2000), 234-40.
3. Li Yingming, Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (A study of mainland China) (Taipei:
Wunan, 1995), 187-209.
4. Huang Kuhui, “Guolong gangling yu liangan guanxi” (Guidelines for National
Reunification and Cross-Strait Relations), in Huang Tianzhong and Zhang
Wuyue, op. cit., 1-24.
5. See Lin Zujia, Liangan jingmao yu zhonggong jinhji (Cross-strait trade and
economy and the economy of the PRC) (Taipei: Tianxia Wenhua, 2005).
|