Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine
The stages of modernization of Ukrainian NPP I&C systems are described in the paper. The first stage (1993—2000) was characterized by use of systems designed by foreign (including USA) companies. The second stage (2001—2011) was characterized by use of systems designed by Ukrainian companies...
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irk-123456789-972502016-03-27T04:02:11Z Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine Yastrebenetsky, M. Rozen, Yu. Klevtsov, A. Gashev, M. The stages of modernization of Ukrainian NPP I&C systems are described in the paper. The first stage (1993—2000) was characterized by use of systems designed by foreign (including USA) companies. The second stage (2001—2011) was characterized by use of systems designed by Ukrainian companies. The modernization strategy is analyzed in two aspects: the strategy of operators and the strategy of I&C systems’ designers. Some features peculiar to the strategy of designers are: an aggregate of hardware, software and service apparatus called “hardware-software complex” (HSC) as central part of systems, which are delivered to NPPs in full assembly and are connected to peripheral equipment at NPP; use of FPGA for performance of safety functions; elaboration of new equipment families. The third stage starts in 2012 and is related to construction of two new units (Khmelnitsky-3 and 4). A new regulatory framework, including regulatory requirements, will be elaborated for I&C systems of these units. Міжнародні конференції «Інформаційні та керуючі системи АЕС і техніка людино-машинного інтерфейсу», що організовуються кожні два-три роки Ядерним товариством США, збирають учасників практично з усіх країн, де експлуатуються або будуються АЕС. У статті наводяться матеріали доповіді «Стратегія модернізації ІКС АЕС в Україні», представленої на 8-й конференції, що відбулася в липні 2012 р. в США (секція «Досвід модернізації АЕС»). Автори аналізують три стадії модернізації ІКС АЕС в Україні. Перша стадія (1993—2000) характеризується використанням систем, розроблених зарубіжними компаніями, друга (2001—2011) — вітчизняними розробниками, третя (з 2012 р.) стадія пов’язана з розробкою нової нормативної бази з ІКС АЕС і підготовкою до спорудження двох нових енергоблоків. Международные конференции «Информационные и управляющие системы АЭС и техника человеко- машинного интерфейса», организуемые каждые два-три года Ядерным обществом США, собирают участников практически из всех стран, где эксплуатируются или строятся АЭС. В статье приводятся материалы доклада «Стратегия модернизации ИУС АЭС в Украине», представленной на 8-й конференции, состоявшейся в июле 2012 г. в США (секция «Опыт модернизации АЭС»). Авторы анализируют три стадии модернизации ИУС АЭС в Украине. Первая стадия (1993— 2000) характеризуется использованием систем, разработанных зарубежными компаниями, вторая (2001—2011) — отечественными разработчиками, третья (с 2012 г.) стадия связана с разработкой новой нормативной базы по ИУС АЭС и подготовкой к строительству двух новых энергоблоков. 2012 Article Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine / M. Yastrebenetsky, Yu. Rozen, A. Klevtsov, M. Gashev // Ядерна та радіаційна безпека. — 2012. — № 4. — С. 59-62. — Бібліогр.: 4 назв. — англ. 2073-6231 http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/97250 621.039.58:004.9 en Ядерна та радіаційна безпека Державне підприємство "Державний науково-технічний центр з ядерної та радіаційної безпеки" Держатомрегулювання України та НАН України |
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Digital Library of Periodicals of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine |
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DSpace DC |
| language |
English |
| description |
The stages of modernization of Ukrainian NPP I&C systems are described in the paper. The first stage
(1993—2000) was characterized by use of systems designed by foreign (including USA) companies. The second
stage (2001—2011) was characterized by use of systems designed by Ukrainian companies. The modernization
strategy is analyzed in two aspects: the strategy of operators and the strategy of I&C systems’ designers. Some
features peculiar to the strategy of designers are: an aggregate of hardware, software and service apparatus
called “hardware-software complex” (HSC) as central part of systems, which are delivered to NPPs in full
assembly and are connected to peripheral equipment at NPP; use of FPGA for performance of safety functions;
elaboration of new equipment families. The third stage starts in 2012 and is related to construction of two new
units (Khmelnitsky-3 and 4). A new regulatory framework, including regulatory requirements, will be
elaborated for I&C systems of these units. |
| format |
Article |
| author |
Yastrebenetsky, M. Rozen, Yu. Klevtsov, A. Gashev, M. |
| spellingShingle |
Yastrebenetsky, M. Rozen, Yu. Klevtsov, A. Gashev, M. Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine Ядерна та радіаційна безпека |
| author_facet |
Yastrebenetsky, M. Rozen, Yu. Klevtsov, A. Gashev, M. |
| author_sort |
Yastrebenetsky, M. |
| title |
Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine |
| title_short |
Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine |
| title_full |
Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine |
| title_fullStr |
Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine |
| title_sort |
strategy of npp i&c systems’ modernization in ukraine |
| publisher |
Державне підприємство "Державний науково-технічний центр з ядерної та радіаційної безпеки" Держатомрегулювання України та НАН України |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/97250 |
| citation_txt |
Strategy of NPP I&C Systems’ Modernization in Ukraine / M. Yastrebenetsky, Yu. Rozen, A. Klevtsov, M. Gashev // Ядерна та радіаційна безпека. — 2012. — № 4. — С. 59-62. — Бібліогр.: 4 назв. — англ. |
| series |
Ядерна та радіаційна безпека |
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AT yastrebenetskym strategyofnppicsystemsmodernizationinukraine AT rozenyu strategyofnppicsystemsmodernizationinukraine AT klevtsova strategyofnppicsystemsmodernizationinukraine AT gashevm strategyofnppicsystemsmodernizationinukraine |
| first_indexed |
2025-07-07T04:41:44Z |
| last_indexed |
2025-07-07T04:41:44Z |
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1836961816902631424 |
| fulltext |
ßäåðíà òà ðàä³àö³éíà áåçïåêà 4 (56).2012 59
T
here are currently 4 NPPs with 15 units operating in
Ukraine: 13 units WWER-1000 and 2 units WWER-
440. All NPPs are managed by one operator: National
Nuclear Energy Generating Company “Energoatom”.
The first reason that necessitated I&C moderniza-
tion was the obsolescence of these systems. I&C systems were
designed in 1979—1983 and do not conform to the modern
level of computer technology. I&C systems had a lot of safety
deficiencies — unsatisfactory level of reliability, diagnostics,
qualification, resistance to external impacts, man-machine in-
terface, etc.
The distribution of units by age is shown in Figure 1. The
lifetime of all units is 30 years. The lifetime of most instru-
mentation is less than 30 years. Hence, the second reason for
I&C modernization was necessitated by units’ life extension and
expiration of instrumentation’s lifetime.
First stage of modernization
The first stage (1993—2000) was characterized by using the
systems designed by foreign companies: USA — Westinghouse,
Czech Republic — Skoda, Russia — Kurchatov Institute,
France — Syzeca, etc. Most of these systems were safety-related.
Ukraine had no uniform strategy for I&C modernization
at that time. Some of these systems had good fate and con-
tinue to operate now. This concerns first of all 11 SPDS for
all Ukrainian WWER-1000 units which operated at that time.
SPDS was designed by “Westinghouse” (USA) together with
joint USA — Ukrainian company “Westron”.
Some of these systems (e. g. computer information systems
designed by Syzeca (France)) were replaced during the second
stage of modernization.
Ukraine did not have its own regulations related to I&C
systems during that time. The Ukrainian Regulatory Authority
used USSR standards and standards of the countries-designers
in licensing process for these systems [1].
Second stage of modernization
The second stage was implemented during 2001—2011. The
main peculiarities of this stage are:
– modern computer techniques were widely used;
– new national regulatory framework was developed;
– most I&C systems were designed and produced by Ukraini-
an companies;
– modernized I&C were not only safety-related systems but
safety systems as well (e.g., reactor protection systems).
The modernization strategy is analyzed in the following as-
pects:
– strategy of operators (NPP or National Nuclear Energy
Generating Company “Energoatom”);
– strategy of I&C systems designers.
The main features peculiar to the strategy of operators are
as follows:
• Most modernizations take place during shutdown for re-
fueling. This time is limited, and in some cases the shutdown
period is insufficient for modernization. In these cases, mod-
ernization is implemented in 2 or 3 stages. (Examples: complete
modernization of the unit computer information system or neu-
tron flux monitoring system). The presence of several stages re-
quired additional activities to ensure the compatibility between
modernized and non-modernized parts of the systems.
• All I&C modernizations can be divided into pilot (mod-
ernizations implemented for the first time at NPP with spe-
60 ßäåðíà òà ðàä³àö³éíà áåçïåêà 4 (56).2012
M. Yastrebenetsky, Yu. Rozen, A. Klevtsov, M. Gashev
cific reactor type) and replicated (modernizations implemented
before at a specific NPP type in Ukraine and showed positive
results). Of course, use of replicated systems is preferable in
terms of safety justification and cost for acquisition of systems.
The scope of licensing actions for replicated modernizations
is substantially smaller than for pilots. A specific stage in the
implementation of a pilot system is its trial operation with ex-
tensive support from the designer and prompt feedback from the
NPP to the designer, involving analysis of all failures, faults or
NPP personnel comments.
• Most modernizations used existing technological algo-
rithms, which were proven by long-term operation of WWER
units in Ukraine, Russia and other countries. The algorithms
were modified to include new functions, e.g. control of primary-
to-secondary leakage accidents.
• Modernizations can be related to the central part of a sys-
tem or to a system as a whole, together with sensors, cables,
actuators. At the beginning of this stage, modernizations in-
volved only central-part of systems (as a rule, computer-based).
In recent times, replacement of cables and sensors is included
into the scope of modernizations.
• Extensive I&C modernization took place before unit life
extension. “Energoatom” paid special attention to these actions
and assigned resources for unit life extension, including replace-
ments of old I&C systems. The Regulatory Authority requested
these replacements from the NPP to receive a license for unit
life extension. An example is I&C systems of South Ukraine
NPP Unit 1, which were modernized to obtain approval for unit
life extension (Table 1).
The main features peculiar to the strategy of designers are
as follows:
• Use of an aggregate of hardware, software and service ap-
paratus called “hardware-software complex” (HSC) as the cen-
tral part of systems. HSC are delivered to NPPs in full assembly,
after checkout and testing, with high level of factory availability.
HSC is connected to peripheral equipment at NPP.
• Ukraine (“Radiy” Company, Kirovograd) pioneered the
application of FPGA for performance of safety functions (reac-
tor protection systems, ESFAS, etc.). Since 2004, more than
40 FPGA-based systems have been installed at Ukrainian NPPs.
IAEA Independent Engineering Review of Instrumentation and
Control Systems Mission took place at the “Radiy” site for re-
view of FPGA technology in December 2010.
• The diversity requirement was not implemented at Ukrainian
NPPs before 2000. Ukrainian regulation [2], issued in 2000, in-
cluded this requirement for reactor protection systems as nec-
essary and for other systems of safety class 2 (the highest) as
recommended. It would be noted that the diversity requirement
caused many contradictions and discussions between the devel-
opers of regulations and operators and designers. After discus-
sions, this requirement was included in regulations as obligatory
only for protection systems. After a five-year period, specialists
began to perceive these requirements as a usual task. The diver-
sity principle has been now incorporated in all reactor protec-
tion systems (designer — “Radiy”) and in other systems (e. g.,
automatic regulators for engineered safety features automated
systems designed by Shevchenko plant).
• Ukrainian companies have elaborated new, their own equip-
ment families (platforms). The parts of these platforms are closed
and can be used only by their designer. Examples are “Radiy”
platforms with wide use of FPGA, “Westron”–“Vulcan” plat-
forms for safety-related systems (analog of Westinghouse plat-
form WDPF-II) and “Vulcan-M” platforms (for safety systems).
The platforms designed by “Impuls” (e. g. complexes MSKU
and working stations PS-5120) are open and can be used by
different companies. USSR platforms UKTS (UKTS-D, UKTS-
BL, UKTS-DKI) modernized in Ukraine are open as well.
• Ukrainian designers have the possibility to use the hard-
ware components from any foreign country. This was impos-
sible before in the USSR, when designers of NPP I&C systems
had to use only USSR components.
•An important step was wide use of fiber optic communica-
tion lines instead of wire lines.
A set of Ukrainian regulations were developed to support
I&C modernization [2] (Fig. 2). These regulations were harmo-
nized as much as possible with requirements of international
safety standards and guidelines published before the preparation
of these documents. It should be noted that the main principles
of IAEA NS-G-1.3 [3] were taken into account in the Ukrainian
regulations before the official issue of this document.
All safety important I&C systems designed and produced
by Ukrainian companies were brought into compliance with
Ukrainian regulations.
The main results of modernizations are as follows [4]:
— increase of equipment dependability, availability and reli-
ability;
— increase of equipment resistance to external impacts;
Table 1. South Ukraine Unit 1 I&C systems that
were modernized for approval of life extension
Name of system Designer
Reactor protection system Radiy (Ukraine)
Reactor power control and limitation
system
Radiy (Ukraine)
Engineered safety features
automated system
Radiy (Ukraine)
Westron (Ukraine)
Automatic regulators (turbine hall)
Shevchenko Plant
(Ukraine)
LvovORGRES
(Ukraine)
Steam generator level and feedwater
control system
Westron (Ukraine)
Refueling machine control system EVIG (Hungary)
Neutron flux monitoring system Impuls (Ukraine)
In-core reactor monitoring systems
KhIKA (Ukraine),
SNIIP-Atom (Russia)
Radiation monitoring system Westron (Ukraine)
Figure 1. Distribution of units by age (as of 1 January 2012)
ßäåðíà òà ðàä³àö³éíà áåçïåêà 4 (56).2012 61
Strategy of NPP I&C systems’ modernization in Ukraine
— increase of accuracy and time response in the control and
checking processes;
— decrease of time for modernization during unit shutdown
for maintenance;
— improvement of operator information support as well as
visualization of technological processes and parameters;
— improvement of diagnostic functions for I&C systems and
technological equipment;
— decrease of contacts and clip connections by more than 10
times because of high level of integration and fiber-optic lines;
— compliance with requirements of international safety
codes, guides and standards.
Wide approbation of I&C systems at Ukrainian NPPs in-
creased the level of international confidence in these systems.
This was demonstrated by delivery of systems and hardware of
Ukrainian designers to foreign NPPs.
Successful experience in operation of new I&C systems at
Ukrainian NPPs provided the possibility to manufacture and
implement similar systems for foreign NPPs (Table 2).
The drawbacks of the modernization strategy are analyzed
as well:
– absence of overall I&C systems modernization design;
– presence of different systems (designed by different com-
panies) with the same functions at NPPs.
The main areas of activities on I&C systems will be the fol-
lowing:
– actions related to life extension of units and equipment;
– development of I&C systems for two new units —
Khmelnitsky-3 and 4. The construction of these units began in
1985, stopped in 1990 pursuant to the Ukrainian Parliament’s
decision on moratorium to build new NPPs and renewed af-
ter 2005. The feasibility study has been completed. The type
of new reactors is WWER-1000, V-392B design (same as
Balakovo NPP), which has some improvements in comparison
Figure 2. Acting pyramid
of Ukrainian regulations
Table 2. New instrumentation and control systems produced by Ukrainian companies for foreign NPPs
NPP and unit number Country Name of system
Ukrainian
manufacturer —
designer of system
Comment
Kozloduy 5, 6 Bulgaria
Engineered safety features
automated system (trains 1, 2, 3)
Radiy
Koeberg 1, 2 South Africa
Computer information system
Westron
Together with Westinghouse
(USA)
Almaraz 1, 2
Spain
Asco 1
Armenia 2 Armenia
Diesel-generator control system
Steam generator level and
feedwater control system
Together with LvovORGRES
(Ukraine)
Leningrad 3, 4 Russia SPDS
Together with PNNL
(USA)
Dukovany 1, 2, 3, 4 Czech Republic
Radiation safety control system
(emission through air pipe)
Together with I&C Energo
(Czech Republic)
Volgodonsk 1
Balakovo 1, 2
Russia Computer information system Impuls, KhiKA
Balakovo 3
Kalinin 1, 2, 3, 4
Russia
Turbine control system Shevchenko plant
Kaiga 3, 4
RAPP 5, 6
India
62 ßäåðíà òà ðàä³àö³éíà áåçïåêà 4 (56).2012
M. Yastrebenetsky, Yu. Rozen, A. Klevtsov, M. Gashev
with operating WWER-1000, V-320 design. The first steps of
I&C design have started;
– consideration of the Fukushima accident lessons for im-
provement of operating systems and development of new sys-
tems (e. g., post-accident monitoring system);
– appearance of new technologies (e.g. wireless sensors) and
new requirements (e.g. to cyber security) which should be taken
into account during development and safety assessment of new
I&C systems.
A common action for all areas is updating of the Ukrainian
regulatory framework and harmonization with modern interna-
tional standards. This framework has to include:
– regulation developed by the Ukrainian Regulatory Autho-
rity with safety requirements for I&C systems;
– standard of the National Nuclear Energy Generating
Company “Energoatom” with technical requirements for safety
important I&C systems.
These two documents are consistent.
After 2001 Ukraine has passed from a country that imported
I&C systems for its own NPPs and has become a country that
not only satisfies its own needs but exports these systems. Some
features peculiar to the strategy for NPP I&C modernization in
Ukraine may be of interest to specialists from other countries:
use of an aggregate of hardware, software and service appara-
tus called “hardware-software complex” (HSC) as the central
part of systems, HSC are delivered to NPPs in full assembly,
after checkout and testing, with high level of factory availability,
which can decrease time to replacement for modernization; use
of FPGA for performance of safety functions, including reactor
protection systems.
1. Licensing Review of Foreign I&C Systems for Ukrainian Nuclear
Power Plants / O. Brenman, R. Denning, etc. — NPIC&HMIT-5. —
Albuquerque, NM, 2006.
2. Ukrainian NPP I&C standard base: elaboration and ap-
plication / M. Yastrebenetsky, Yu. Rozen, A. Siora, V. Bezsaly. —
NPIC&HMIT-7. — Las Vegas, NV, 2010.
3. IAEA NS-G-1.3. Instrumentation and control systems important
to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide. — Vienna, 2002.
4. Nuclear Power Plants Safety: Nuclear Reactors Control and
Protection systems / M. Yastrebenetsky, Yu. Rozen, S. Vinogradska,
G. Johnson, etc. — Kiev : Osnova-Print, Ukraine, 2011. — 764 p. —
(in Russian).
Retrieved 03.10.2012.
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